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Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the Public in Operations

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as represented by

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Abstract

In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse civilian (“public”) organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. However, the CF’s history of working with, for example, NGOs, has been limited and may pose challenges to collaboration (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). The purpose of this study was to 1) further understand the core issues that help or hinder civil-military collaboration, specifically involving the CF, NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, and the media, and 2) highlight recommendations for potential training and education for effective civil-military collaboration in the public domain. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs), representing diverse organizations and entities, both military (CF) and civilian (NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, the media), were consulted to elicit first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Results indicated that the CF did not effectively acknowledge their counterpart’s expertise and experience and that the CF should refrain from “*taking charge*” and telling others how to do their job. Civilian participants said that the CF had open dialogue and that CF leaders were good at engaging, but that the CF could engage more with civilians and civil organizations given the challenges faced by civilians in navigating the military system and CF communication channels. Military and civilian participants said that one strategy to facilitate collaboration was to build positive relationships. However, civilian SMEs thought that the military overstepped its jurisdiction and that roles and responsibilities needed to be clearly established. NGO or IO adherence to the principle of neutrality varied across organizations and this had potential negative ramifications for the ability of some organizations to operate safely in non-permissive environments. Participants included both negative and positive perceptions about one another. Stereotype reduction occurred following contact with one another and after learning about another organization’s values, intentions, and operational objectives and goals. Afghan nationals provided examples of CF trust violations that may turn the local population against them. Overall, participants argued that there was a general lack of knowledge regarding the contemporary operating theatre and the multiple players involved. Gaining knowledge of potential collaboration counterparts was the core recommendation for future training and education to support civil-military collaboration in a comprehensive operating context, including the public domain, and this training and education needs to be fully integrated.

Résumé

Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont plus que jamais appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d'organisations variées, c'est-à-dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d'autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Cependant, le fait que les FC n'aient pas eu souvent l'occasion par le passé de travailler auprès d'ONG, par exemple, peut entraver la collaboration entre ces organisations (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008). Le but de cette étude était de 1) mieux connaître les principaux facteurs qui favorisent ou entravent la collaboration civilo-militaire, en particulier lorsque les parties concernées sont les FC, des ONG, des OI, des citoyens afghans et les médias, et 2) recueillir les recommandations relativement à la formation et à l'éducation dans le but d'accroître l'efficacité de la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte public. Nous avons demandé à des experts de diverses organisations et entités militaires (FC) et civiles (ONG, OI, citoyens afghans, médias) de raconter leurs expériences de collaboration dans le théâtre. Les résultats ont révélé que les FC n'ont pas su tirer pleinement profit de l'expertise et de l'expérience de leurs homologues et qu'elles devraient éviter de « prendre les choses en main » et de dire aux autres comment faire leur travail. Les participants civils ont mentionné que les FC sont ouvertes au dialogue et que leurs dirigeants savent mobiliser le personnel efficacement, mais qu'elles pourraient travailler encore plus étroitement avec les civils afin d'aider ces derniers à se familiariser avec l'appareil militaire et les voies de communication des FC. Les participants civils et militaires s'entendaient pour dire que l'établissement de relations positives facilite la collaboration. Toutefois, les EM civils croient que les militaires outrepassent parfois leurs champs de compétence et que les rôles et les responsabilités devraient ainsi être définis plus clairement. Le respect des ONG et des OI au principe de neutralité varie d'une organisation à l'autre, ce qui peut nuire la capacité de certaines d'entre elles à évoluer sécuritairement en milieu hostile. Les participants ont émis des commentaires tant positifs que négatifs à propos des uns des autres. On a observé que les stéréotypes s'estompent lorsque les gens entrent en contact et lorsqu'ils approfondissent leurs connaissances au sujet des valeurs, des intentions et des objectifs opérationnels des autres organisations. Des citoyens afghans ont signalé des cas d'abus de confiance de la part des FC qui pourraient avoir contribué à retourner la population locale contre elles. Dans l'ensemble, les participants ont indiqué que leurs connaissances à propos du théâtre d'opérations contemporain et des nombreux acteurs qui y œuvrent sont insuffisantes. La principale recommandation concernant la formation et l'éducation liées à la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte opérationnel vise à mettre davantage l'accent sur l'acquisition de connaissances au sujet des collaborateurs potentiels, notamment ceux de la sphère publique. Pour y parvenir, il faut mettre en place un programme de formation et d'éducation pleinement homogène.

Executive Summary

Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the Public in Operations

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, Andrea L. Brown, and Craig Flear; Humansystems® Incorporated; DRDC Toronto CR2011-073; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; March 2011.

This research was conducted in support of a Defence Research and Development Canada -- Toronto (DRDC Toronto) applied research project (ARP) examining civil-military relations in operations. In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of diverse civilian organizations and entities, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations in theatre, and the media. Referred to as a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) operating environment, the need to be "JIMP-capable" has been cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Designs as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO), and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). However, the "public" dimension of JIMP, which includes a number of non-governmental civilian entities and organizations, such as NGOs, IOs, local populations in theatre, and the media, poses a significant challenge to effective collaboration outcomes (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). Previous exploratory research conducted for DRDC Toronto revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological issues impacting on civil-military collaboration (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010).

The purpose of this study was to 1) further understand the core issues that help or hinder collaboration of CF members with other players in the Public context (e.g., with the NGO community), and 2) elicit recommendations from subject matter experts (SMEs) for potential training and education that may assist in making collaboration in theatre more effective for the diverse, multiple parties involved. To do this, related work reviewed the most relevant academic and scientific literature (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear, & Brown, 2011) pertaining to five core themes that emerged from the previous study (Thomson et al., 2010), including negotiation (a critical activity of collaboration), power, identity, stereotypes/prejudice, and trust. Then a number of SMEs representing diverse organizations (e.g., the United Nations, Médecins sans Frontières), were asked to provide first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Data were collected from September 27, 2010 to January 7, 2011 using a semi-structured discussion protocol, which guided the discussions about the core themes.

Results showed that a number of organizational, social and psychological factors impact collaboration. Civilian participant recollections suggest that when collaborating with organizations from the public domain (e.g., NGOs, IOs), the CF should acknowledge the expertise and experience of members of such organizations, and refrain from "*taking charge*" and telling others how to do their job. Civilian participants mentioned that the CF had open dialogue and that CF leaders were good at engaging. They also suggested that even more engagement would be ideal, because features of the military system (e.g., communication channels) make it difficult for outsiders to access this system. In turn, increased engagement would give the CF greater situational

awareness of the needs and interests of others. Civilian SMEs thought that the military sometimes overstepped its jurisdiction -- that the military was “*trespassing on development*” and should rather consult the development experts. Participants, both civilian and military, argued that building positive relationships at the start of interactions was an effective strategy. They provided examples of working to establish common ground, hosting inclusive events, and actively listening to others’ concerns and interests. Central to the identity of NGO and IO personnel was the principle of neutrality, although adherence to this principle varied across NGO and IO organizations. A few NGO/IO participants mentioned that their organizations were not in a position to operate in a JIMP context, because to do so would compromise their capacity to deliver aid to those in need. Some organizations try to maintain absolute impartiality to political agendas and the conflict in order to gain access to those who need aid. Other organizations did not have a problem with accepting donations from governments or militaries. Civilian participants suggested that this variance can present challenges to NGO and IO professional distinctions, as well as send potentially mixed messages to others. This could have negative consequences in operations as some NGO and IO organizations absolutely need to be seen as impartial to operate in non-permissive environments. There was some evidence of stereotypes having impacted on collaboration, as participants recounted both negative and positive perceptions about one another. However, stereotypes also seemed to be reduced as a product of contact with one another and of learning about another organization’s values, intentions, and operational objectives and goals. One CF SME mentioned that CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) had branded itself as being somewhat different from typical CF members in order to gain traction with civilian counterparts, by downplaying the “*army guy*” persona and avoiding “*int-type questions*” (i.e., intelligence-type questions). There was also evidence of trust playing an important role within this domain. Building trust of the military among the local population was achieved by demonstrating competence, sharing risks and experiences, and maintaining professional integrity. However, trust violations were also noted, as Afghan nationals provided examples of CF trust violations that may have turned the local population against them.

According to a few civilian participants, there was a general lack of knowledge regarding the contemporary operating theatre and the multiple players involved. Gaining knowledge of potential collaboration counterparts was the core recommendation for future training and education to support civil-military collaboration in a JIMP operational context. It was also felt that training and education needed to be fully integrated, meaning that civilians should be involved in the CF system from the start. Participants also noted that the CF should elicit lessons learned from their civilian counterparts to gain a broad comprehension of each player’s role within the contemporary operating environment.

Sommaire

La collaboration entre les Forces canadiennes et le public en contexte opérationnel

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L'étude dont il est ici question a été menée dans le cadre d'un projet de recherche appliquée de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto (RDDC Toronto) portant sur les réactions civilo-militaires en contexte opérationnel. Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d'organisations variées, c'est-à-dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d'autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Selon le Directeur - Concepts et schémas de la Force terrestre, l'aptitude à évoluer dans un contexte opérationnel interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP) constitue un élément clé pour la réalisation du concept d'opérations adaptables et dispersées (OAD) pour l'Armée de demain. Par ailleurs, cette aptitude est essentielle à la réussite des missions dans des environnements terrestres de plus en plus complexes (Gizewski et Rostek, 2007). Cependant, l'aspect « public » du contexte IIMP rend particulièrement difficile la tenue d'une collaboration efficace (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008). Une étude exploratoire antérieure menée par RDDC Toronto a révélé un certain nombre de facteurs organisationnels, sociaux et psychologiques influençant la collaboration civilo-militaire (Thomson, Adams, Hall et Flear, 2010).

L'étude avait pour but de 1) mieux connaître les principaux facteurs qui favorisent ou entravent la collaboration entre les membres des FC et les autres intervenants en contexte public (p. ex., avec des ONG), et 2) recueillir les recommandations d'experts en la matière (EM) relativement aux possibilités de formation pouvant contribuer à améliorer l'efficacité de la collaboration dans le théâtre entre plusieurs parties variées. Pour parvenir à nos fins, nous avons examiné les ouvrages scientifiques et universitaires les plus pertinents (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear et Brown, 2011) portant sur les cinq thèmes principaux dégagés lors d'une étude précédente (Thomson et coll., 2010), soit la négociation (une activité de collaboration essentielle), le pouvoir, l'identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés et la confiance. Ensuite, nous avons demandé à des experts de diverses organisations (p. ex., Nations Unies, Médecins sans Frontières, etc.) de raconter leurs expériences de collaboration dans le théâtre. Les données ont été recueillies du 27 septembre 2010 au 7 janvier 2011 à l'aide d'un protocole semi-structuré orientant les discussions autour des thèmes principaux.

Les résultats révèlent que l'efficacité de la collaboration est influencée par des facteurs organisationnels, sociaux et psychologiques. Les participants civils interrogés ont indiqué que les FC devraient reconnaître l'expertise et l'expérience des membres des organisations du domaine public (ONG, OI, etc.) avec lesquelles elles collaborent et éviter de « prendre les choses en main » et de leur dire comment faire leur travail. Les participants civils ont également mentionné que les FC sont ouvertes au dialogue et que leurs dirigeants savent mobiliser le personnel efficacement. Toujours selon eux, l'idéal serait d'insister davantage sur la mobilisation, puisque certains

mécanismes de l'appareil militaire (p. ex., les voies de communication) font obstacle à l'intégration des parties externes. Ce faisant, les FC bénéficieraient d'une meilleure connaissance de la situation en ce qui a trait aux besoins et aux intérêts des autres organisations. De leur côté, les EM pensent que les FC outrepassent leurs domaines de compétence. Par exemple, lorsqu'il s'agit de perfectionnement, elles auraient plutôt intérêt à consulter les experts en la matière. Les participants, tant du côté militaire que civil, ont avancé que le fait de tisser d'emblée des relations positives est une bonne stratégie. Les exemples fournis comprennent l'établissement de bases communes, l'organisation d'activités inclusives et l'écoute active des préoccupations et des intérêts des autres. L'un des principes fondamentaux des ONG et des OI est la neutralité, encore que le respect à l'égard de ce principe varie d'une organisation à l'autre. Certains membres d'ONG et d'OI ont affirmé que leurs organisations ne sont pas aptes à intervenir en contexte IIMP, puisque cela compromettrait leur aptitude à fournir de l'aide aux gens dans le besoin. Certaines organisations essaient de demeurer complètement neutres à l'égard des programmes politiques et des conflits afin d'avoir accès aux gens qui ont besoin d'aide. Les autres organisations ne sont pas réticentes à l'idée d'accepter des dons de la part d'organismes gouvernementaux ou militaires. Les participants civils croient que cet écart peut poser obstacle à la distinction professionnelle des ONG et des OI en plus de livrer un message contradictoire aux autres. Cela pourrait donc avoir des conséquences négatives sur le déroulement des opérations, puisque certaines ONG et OI doivent absolument être perçues comme étant impartiales pour pouvoir participer à des opérations en milieu hostile. Certaines observations laissent entendre que les stéréotypes influencent parfois la collaboration. En effet, les participants ont formulé des propos tant positifs que négatifs à l'égard des uns des autres. En revanche, les stéréotypes semblent diminuer à mesure que les relations interpersonnelles se développent et lorsque les gens approfondissent leurs connaissances à propos des valeurs, des intentions et des objectifs opérationnels des autres organisations. Selon l'un des EM des FC, la COCIM (coopération civilo-militaire) se différencie du type de coopération habituel entre les membres des FC de manière à ce que ces derniers puissent établir de bonnes relations avec leurs homologues civils. Ainsi, on demande aux membres des FC d'atténuer leur image de militaire et d'éviter les sujets liés au renseignement. La confiance semble également jouer un rôle important. Pour gagner la confiance de la population locale, les militaires ont dû lui montrer leurs compétences, faire face à des dangers et partager des expériences avec elle, et faire preuve de rigueur professionnelle. Cependant, des citoyens afghans ont signalé quelques cas d'abus de confiance de la part de militaires qui pourraient avoir incité la population locale à se retourner contre les FC.

Selon certains participants civils, le théâtre d'opérations contemporain et les nombreux acteurs qui s'y trouvent sont généralement méconnus. La principale recommandation concernant la formation et l'éducation liées à la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte opérationnel IIMP vise à mettre davantage l'accent sur l'acquisition de connaissances au sujet des collaborateurs potentiels. Les participants croient aussi que la formation et l'éducation devraient être données de manière pleinement homogène, c'est-à-dire que les civils devraient, dès le début d'une collaboration, être intégrés à l'environnement des FC. Les participants ont aussi observé que les FC devraient tenir compte des leçons apprises par leurs homologues civils afin d'approfondir leur connaissance des rôles de chacun dans un contexte opérationnel contemporain.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse civilian organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. Referred to as a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) operating environment, the need to be "JIMP-capable" is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Designs as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO), and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). According to this approach, the CF is in Afghanistan not only to establish security with the help of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other military forces, but also to help other non-military organizations promote development and political and economic stabilization. Their role in other regions of the world, for example in Haiti, also demands that they help enable relief efforts and development.

Actors in the "public" domain include NGOs, IOs, local host populations, and the media. Some of the reasons that the public might need to collaborate with the CF in operations or seek their support include the fact that the CF can assist with direct delivery of programs (i.e., moving assets to distribute aid, personnel, or gear), providing information (e.g., security reports), and providing security or escorts. On the other hand, possible reasons why the CF may need to collaborate with the public include the fact that the public can assist with language translation services and gathering information. Whatever the reason for collaboration, today's operations require the CF to share an operating space with a number of actors in the field. According to Leslie, Gizewski, and Rostek (2008), however, the "public" dimension of JIMP poses a significant challenge to effective collaboration outcomes. For example, differences in organizational cultures, systems, and mandates may represent barriers. Indeed, research with subject matter experts (SMEs) from both the civil and military domains has identified a number of potential challenges as well as potential ways to mitigate these challenges (Holton, Febbraro, Filardo, Barnes, Fraser, & Spiece, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010).

As part of a multi-year, Defence Research and Development Canada - Toronto (DRDC Toronto) applied research project (ARP) specifically investigating the public domain of the JIMP operational context, "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain," research revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological factors that impact civil-military collaboration (Thomson et al., 2010). For example, respondents noted that issues such as shared power and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, mutual respect, and mutual trust all impacted their collaborative efforts with other personnel within the JIMP environment. Differences in communicating, negotiating, planning and decision making were also highlighted as potential barriers to effective civil-military collaboration. It is important, therefore, to further understand the facilitators and challenges of collaboration in a JIMP operational context, with special focus on the civil-military domain.



1.2 Project Purpose

The purpose of this study was to further understand the core issues that help or hinder collaboration among CF members and those who represent the Public aspect of the JIMP framework (e.g., members of NGO and IO community, local populations, and the media). To begin, we investigated five core themes that emerged from the previous study (Thomson et al., 2010), including negotiation (a critical activity of collaboration), power, identity, stereotypes/prejudice, and trust. Specifically, we examined the most pertinent scientific and academic literature pertaining to these areas (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear, & Brown, 2011) before developing an SME discussion protocol for subsequent meetings with a larger and more diverse sample than was employed in the previous work. Thus, a number of SMEs, representing diverse organizations (e.g., the CF, the United Nations, Médecins sans Frontières), were asked to provide first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Through these first-hand accounts, this study aimed at exploring in depth the specific themes associated with collaboration among diverse players in a JIMP framework. A second purpose of this study was to elicit from SMEs recommendations for potential training and education that may assist in making collaboration in theatre more effective for the diverse, multiple parties involved.

2. Method

2.1 Semi-structured Feedback Discussion Protocol

The current study used a semi-structured discussion protocol to elicit from SMEs their first-hand accounts of collaboration between civil and military actors in a JIMP operational context. Based on previous findings, we generated open-ended questions that were designed to tap five primary themes, including negotiation, power, identity, perceptions and stereotypes, and trust. These themes emerged in previous research examining civil-military relationships (Holton, Febbraro, Filardo, Barnes, Fraser, & Spiece, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall & Flear, 2010). The semi-structured approach encouraged participants to speak freely and to raise topics that came to mind, while allowing researchers to raise themes of interest, if they did not spontaneously arise. These discussions needed to be dynamic to reveal the major themes and relationships that are relevant to collaborating in a JIMP operational context. Participants were also asked to provide as much detail as possible in order to develop a holistic picture of the situation in which the collaboration occurred. Questions acted as probes to further elaborate participant responses. We also asked participants to discuss any pre-deployment training they had received regarding collaboration with diverse actors and to provide advice, based on their experience, regarding future training and education initiatives.

2.2 Procedure

2.2.1 Recruitment

SME participants were identified through the existing professional networks of the Principal Investigator, the Principal DRDC Investigator, Co-Investigators, personal contacts, previous NGO participants¹ (from Thomson et al., 2010), and participants in the current study². Potential participants were contacted by the Principal Investigator, personal contacts, or previous NGO participants to inform them of the study and inquire about their interest in participating. The purpose and nature of the study as well as the SME's potential contribution to it was shared in the initial contact. Potential participants were informed that their participation was wholly voluntary and that it would be in the form of a meeting with trained researchers, that it would take approximately 2 hours, and that the researchers would travel to meet them or do the discussion via telephone or video conference. After participants gave their consent to share their experiences, the Principal Investigator set up a time and place for the meeting. Before each discussion, the Principal Investigator emailed SMEs an Information Letter describing the study and their role in the study (Annex A), a Voluntary Consent Form, which they read and signed in advance of the meeting (Annex B), and a Biographical Data Form (Annex C).

¹ Two participants from Thomson et al. (2010) assisted the Principal Investigator in recruitment by passing on the contact information of interested participants in the NGO community.

² Known as the "snowball" technique, after the discussion, participants were asked to recommend anyone that would meet the requirements and may be interested in participating.

2.2.2 Participants

This study included 25 participants. Participants represented NGOs (36%), IOs (24%), the CF (24%), the Canadian media (8%), and Afghan nationals (8%). Gender was relatively evenly distributed (61% male).³ Ages ranged from 24 to 61 with the average age being 40 years old. Participants were born in Canada (68%), Europe (24%), and Afghanistan (8%). The majority of the participants had a graduate/professional degree or had completed some graduate courses (69%), while others had completed college (13%), university (9%), or high school (9%). Most had recent operational experiences in a variety of operations (including Afghanistan, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Cyprus, etc.), and had collaborated with multiple actors in theatre at some point in their career. Participants were from a number of organizations, including Médecins sans Frontières, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Air Serv International, Peace Dividend Trust, Canadian Press, and Right to Play. CF participants were CIMIC officers as well as Company line officers.

2.2.3 Feedback Discussion

Twenty-three feedback discussions were conducted in various locations across Canada, including Kingston, Gagetown, Ottawa, and Toronto, from September 27, 2010 to January 7, 2011. Teleconferences or video conferences (i.e., Skype) were held between the Guelph office of HumanSystems and Afghanistan, Liberia, Uganda, Kenya, Washington, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary.

Following an introduction of the research team⁴, each SME was briefed on the purposes of the study, its relevance and potential benefits, the nature of their participation (i.e., format of discussion, time commitment, voluntary consent, anonymity, etc.), and any possible risks. With consent to begin the discussion, the researcher asked permission to record the conversation, as this would provide a more accurate record of the meeting. Participants were told that no one outside of the research team would have access to the recordings and that everything that they raised during the feedback discussion would be kept anonymous. All SMEs agreed to participate voluntarily.

Following this, the researchers began the SME feedback discussion. Researchers used the semi-structured discussion protocol to advance specific discussion of the SME's experiences in collaborating with diverse actors in an operational setting. Each discussion was guided by a trained researcher, who encouraged participants to discuss the core themes of interest. When necessary and appropriate, researchers probed for further clarity regarding important themes associated with collaboration. The average length of the SME feedback discussions was 68 minutes.

Once the discussion was completed, researchers debriefed the participants. It was explained to them that the feedback discussion would be transcribed onto a text document, using the recording to guarantee accuracy. Again, participants were reassured of the anonymity of the meeting, and that researchers would remove any identifying material, such as names and places, to ensure anonymity in publications or reports of research findings. Participants were informed that they could review

³ Gender breakdown for participant categories are as follows: NGOs (33% male; 67% female), IOs (50% male; 50% female), CF (100% male), media (100% male), and Afghan nationals (100% male).

⁴ Most discussions were conducted by two members of the research team, one leading the discussion and the other taking notes. However, some discussions were conducted by only one team member.

the transcripts if they chose for verification⁵. Researchers answered any questions that participants had about the study. Participants were told that following the completion of the research, a summary of the findings could be made available to them if they so desired. In the meantime, however, participants were reminded that they could contact the Principal DRDC Investigator at any time if they had further questions. All forms were collected by the research team at this time. Lastly, participants were thanked and provided with remuneration (\$40) for their time, which they could keep for themselves or donate to a charity of their choice. For those who did not participate in a face-to-face discussion, a cheque was mailed to the participants who chose to receive the remuneration.

2.3 Data Collection

With the consent of each participant, SME face-to-face feedback discussions (N=14) were audio-recorded using a digital voice recorder. Teleconferences (N=8) used the digital voice recorder with a special phone jack allowing the recording to occur through the phone. Video conferences (N=3) were captured using a call recorder for Skype from Ecamm Network⁶ that collected both audio and video⁷.

After the meeting, researchers then downloaded the audio file to a computer for transcription. SME feedback discussions were transcribed verbatim, except for identifying information, such as names and places, by the research team. Transcription tools included Dragon Naturally Speaking speech to text software⁸, an Infinity foot pedal⁹, and Express Scribe software¹⁰. Random quality assurance checks comparing the audio file to the transcription were undertaken by a member of the research team by listening to the audio file and simultaneously reading the transcription to ensure accuracy.

It should be noted that capturing the audio data proved to be challenging at times. As requested by the participant, some of the face-to-face discussions were held in restaurants. External noise, such as people talking and music, impacted negatively on the quality of the audio. Although all of the audio was successfully captured, a few participants had some phrases/words missing in their transcripts. However, these losses were relatively minor in terms of substance.

2.4 Qualitative Data Analysis

All 25 transcribed discussions were coded based on a conceptual framework (Figure 1) developed by Thomson et al. (2010).

⁵ Only one participant asked to see their transcript, mainly to provide clarification around points made in the discussion.

⁶ <http://ecamm.com/mac/callrecorder/>

⁷ Only one Skype session included video and audio. Two included only audio.

⁸ <http://www.nuance.com/dragon/index.htm>. This software was only used for a few of the transcriptions. The researcher would listen to the audio, speak the dialogue, and Dragon would convert the researcher's speech into text.

⁹ This allows for hands-free start, stop, fast forward, and rewind.

¹⁰ <http://www.nch.com.au/scribe/index.html>. This software was required for the foot pedal. Express Scribe allows one to play the audio file in conjunction with typing text. The text was later copied, pasted and reformatted into Word.

PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK OF CF COLLABORATION IN A JIMP OPERATIONAL CONTEXT




Figure 1: Preliminary conceptual framework for CF collaboration in a JIMP operational environment (Thomson et al., 2010)

The conceptual framework, based on relevant literature and exploratory research, highlights the relationships between the factors likely to promote or frustrate collaboration in a JIMP operational context. As shown, it includes factors that influence collaboration, the process of collaboration, and the outcomes of collaboration. For the purposes of the current study, the conceptual framework by Thomson et al. was developed into a coding scheme (see Table 1 for the condensed version).

Table 1: Coding Scheme

Collaboration in a JIMP Context	Variables
Factors Influencing Collaboration	Individual Factors
	Organizational Factors
	External Factors
Process of Collaboration	Conditions for Collaboration
	Motivation for Collaboration
	Collaboration
	Preparation for Collaboration
Outcomes of Collaboration	Cumulative Impact
	Performance
	Personal Relationships
	Collective Understanding
	Satisfaction with Process

In accordance with the framework, the coding scheme was divided into three main components of collaboration: factors influencing collaboration, the process of collaboration, and outcomes of collaboration. The factors influencing collaboration are individual factors (e.g., knowledge, skills/abilities, attitudes/values, and personality), organizational factors (e.g., governance, shared values, strategy, systems, staff/skills, structure, style, and organizational culture), and external factors (e.g., risk, uncertainty, time pressure, mission type, and national culture). The process of collaboration included such factors as conditions for collaboration (e.g., shared goals, shared values, shared power, shared risk, mutual trust, mutual respect, shared identity, stereotypes, and roles/responsibilities), motivation for collaboration (i.e., internally or externally driven), collaboration (e.g., negotiation, communication, and feedback), and preparation for collaboration (i.e., other things that prepared for collaboration not related to training). Outcomes of collaboration contained variables such as the cumulative impact (i.e., indirect and direct¹¹), performance (e.g.,

¹¹ A direct impact of collaboration between an NGO and the CF might be the distribution of aid to those in need. On the other hand, an indirect impact of collaboration could be an "implicit ethical message" that accompanies this activity (The Do No Harm Handbook, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects – Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2004), and this may not always be positive. For example, the activity may suggest that those who carry arms and hold power are the ones who determine who gets aid (The Do No Harm Handbook, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects – Collaborative for

goal attained), personal relationships, collective understanding (e.g., understanding collaboration partner), and satisfaction with the process (e.g., instrumental, personal, and feelings). All the variables could also be further broken down positively or negatively (e.g., trust is positive and mistrust is negative). Furthermore, variables also had a definition as well as an example to guide inclusion/exclusion decisions about ambiguous or novel dialogue.

Each transcription was individually analysed using a qualitative software programme called NVivo8¹². A member of the research team read the transcripts and coded the occurrence of each collaboration reference according to the coding scheme. NVivo8 allows organization and classification of the dialogue in each feedback discussion according to the corresponding theme in the coding scheme. NVivo8 is also able to combine all the occurrences of a particular theme for further analysis. For example, all the dialogue relating to the indirect cumulative impact of the collaboration was available to be viewed together. Moreover, participant numbers were attached to each dialogue to further classify the organization (e.g., NGO, IO, etc.). Therefore, this enabled the research team to pinpoint which organizations discussed the indirect cumulative impact of collaboration and how frequently this dialogue occurred.

2.5 Methodological Considerations and Limitations

There are a few methodological considerations and limitations that should be noted in the context of the current study. One limitation is that there is little empirical research investigating the impact of various factors on collaboration, especially in relation to collaboration between the CF or military in general and the public. Due to this lack of empirical research, this study was largely exploratory in nature. Further empirical research will be needed in order to support the particular findings highlighted in this research.

The semi-structured SME discussion protocol used in this study allowed the research team to address particular themes (negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes, and trust) that arose in previous research (Thomson et al., 2010). Many of the findings were replicated in the current study. However, future research may investigate fewer topics and focus primarily on strategies associated with building relationships in theatre as this was viewed as a critical process for effective collaboration.

Though the current research relied on a fairly good sample size (N=25), the great variation that exists within the public domain (e.g., in terms of mandates, goals, size, culture, and structure of various NGOs and IOs, as well as the diversity that exists among local populations) suggests that greater representation may be required. For instance, though inputs from the local population (Afghanistan) was highly valuable for the study, they were few in number (N=2). As well, though we had initially sought to include only NGO representatives with operational experience working with the CF, this criterion became a challenge to meet. Following consultation with the Scientific Authority, we decided to broaden our scope to include NGO representatives who had had experience with any military system in operations. As this work captures a limited set of opinions, the findings may or may not be representative of the experiences of all personnel working within

Development Action, Inc., 2004), when in fact this, according to the NGO community, should be determined primarily by the need itself.

¹² More information regarding NVivo can be found at http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx.

JIMP environments. However, a level of saturation was reached, in that towards the end of the data collection, no new major themes were emerging.

It is also important to acknowledge that, in general, although the discussion protocol was designed to elicit both positive and negative aspects of collaboration in the JIMP environment (i.e., facilitators and barriers), the SME descriptions of collaboration within this report may appear more negative than positive, and that the descriptions often focus on the challenges rather than the achievements of collaboration efforts within the JIMP context. This may reflect the current tone of the civil-military debate as discussions were intended to allow respondents to reflect on their personal experiences. Still, there are a number of examples that also depict ways in which individuals representing diverse organizations built positive relationships with others in the field.



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3. Results

The following chapter examines SMEs' first-hand accounts of collaboration among civilian and military actors, specifically highlighting examples of effective and ineffective collaboration. The discussion that follows highlights techniques that made collaboration successful and uncovers strategies that SMEs used to overcome particular challenges and barriers. We begin our examination by looking generally at collaboration. Consistent with our framework, collaboration includes examples of modes of communication, engagement, methods for building relationships, and negotiation styles and approaches. The following sections consider the factors that influence collaboration either positively or negatively. These include issues related to power (roles and responsibilities), identity, trust, and perceptions and stereotypes. Again, we highlight examples provided by participants that either promote or frustrate collaboration, and when available articulate those ways in which SMEs were able to overcome challenges to collaboration.

It should be noted that because all SMEs were asked to describe their experiences of working in a civil-military context with an emphasis around collaboration, power, identity, stereotypes, and trust, each participant spoke on these topics. The results, therefore, include the responses that show the particular nuances articulated in the data under these phenomena. We highlighted the most prevalent themes pertaining to collaboration and the core factors influencing the process.

3.1 Collaboration

According to our preliminary framework of CF collaboration in a JIMP operational context (Thomson et al., 2011), collaboration consists of a number of activities, including communicating, negotiating, planning and decision-making, and receiving feedback from the collaboration experience. SMEs discussed issues of communication and engagement, negotiation (building positive relationships at the outset and acknowledging others' expertise and experience), and planning and decision-making.

3.1.1 Open Communication and Engagement

SMEs underscored the importance of communication and engagement when working with individuals who represent diverse organizations. In many cases, the CF was viewed as having open dialogue, providing information without being requested to do so. In fact, discussing issues of detainees in theatre, one SME from an IO thought that the CF's transparency and enthusiasm was a "role model" to other forces. He recalled,

"If there is the slightest – I really would like to underline the slightest – suspicion of ill-treatments...we get a letter and this is explained to us before we actually meet the detainee...I mean...sorry...I've been 10 years with [organization] and I do not always get letters from armed forces telling me basically, 'Oh, by the way, next time you come and...meet Abdula (for example, let's call him Abdula), meet that detainee, he will tell you that...and this is our [CF] opinion.' ...[or]... 'When you meet this detainee, this is probably what they will tell you' or 'We have a problem with some detainees who have a health issue. What is your advice or how could we do that?' you know, or 'We have this guy who has a particular problem, what would be your advice?' ...And this is really quite something...it really is quite something!"

With respect to implementing policy on the ground, one SME mentioned that there is effective discussion with senior officials from his IO and the CF to get it right. He stated,

“It’s basically a discussion about implementation of policies. And where we think certain policies should change. Where we tell them ‘Okay, this particular point here we really think we have to take it up’ and they tell us ‘Okay, that’s very good. It’s a good point. Please refer it’ ... We refer it to Ottawa. I refer it to Geneva. And Geneva talks about it with Ottawa.”

Another SME from an NGO described CF communications as “friendly,” “diplomatic,” and “transparent.” In his words,

“[The] Canadian Forces are very good at being friendly and open in a very transparent way...I just think that they’re nice. Maybe I don’t see the clandestine...When I find people like [Name] and others very open, I even find Intel people open...the Canadians don’t seem to have bottom lines. They are very awkward about that and very awkward about ‘No, we can’t talk to you about this’ ...they find more diplomatic ways of talking about it or they really want to help and share because I think they’re nice people...They’re very helpful.”

Having a common language with the CF also made communication easier for one NGO SME who was an ex-CF member. He said, “What we did enjoy is we enjoyed that commonality of language. We had the same terminology, the same understanding of operational objectives. So made it very easy to go along.” This sentiment was echoed by another SME representing the NGO community. She said that knowing that the military thinks in “stats, details, specifics” in advance, it was advisable to “push that part of your brain a little more when you go into these meetings and discussions, and that that is where they are coming from and that’s the kind of information they need.” Some of this thinking she gained from participating on CF training exercises, where she learned their “concerns,” “limitations,” and “lingo.” Another said that the CF members’ communication was direct and to the point, and that this was appreciated. Information received from CF personnel has been described as direct and to the point, which results in effective communication. “I would say 75% of the guys I talk to...talk about what they know. They talk about what they’ve seen. They talk about what they’ve done...and that’s it... it’s engrained in them to stay within their lane, okay...Talk about what you know, don’t speculate.”

However, there was some evidence in the discussions that military communication styles could also hinder the growth of relationships in some cases. For example, one SME from an NGO cautioned that without a previous history between collaboration counterparts, “certain military people do have a propensity (when they don’t know you) to use their military words...and, whether they do it on purpose or not, it does divide rather than unify. If they’re trying to build relationships, that’s probably not a good way to do it.” The preceding SME responses suggest that communication between the CF and the public can be furthered by ensuring open and transparent dialogue that addresses the concerns and interests of the various parties, but also is crafted in a way that minimizes jargon and industry-specific terminology.

Communication itself can be facilitated by active engagement between collaboration counterparts. Non-military SMEs suggested that the CF should:

“engage more. Talk more with the people, especially with the people that work for you. The more you engage them, the more you talk, the more you are going to understand the local culture...that way you can learn things that are important to that society and that you would otherwise have not paid attention to...knowing the culture, knowing the language, knowing the people, knowing the history helps a lot because if you have some extent, some

knowledge about an area, about an ethnic group, what kind of culture they have, it kind of helps you to integrate into the context, to the environment, to the society and with, with care, with, yeah with care, with trust and to, to collaborate and to engage with your local counterparts as right as possible, that, that really helps.”

For example, one SME from an NGO described the importance of engaging stakeholders in humanitarian operations (in this case, the local population) and how this has lead to effective implementation of his program that is working to provide clean water.

“If you come in...and lead and say... ‘We [NGO] have equipment. We have training. We have stuff for you [local population] and this stuff will get your people clean water. So, we have a solution and in order for your solution to run, you need personnel to be trained, you need places for it to be put in, and you need the following things to happen... Who’s going to give me that?’ And then, they’ll [local population] fall in line...one [community member] will say, ‘I’ll give you the vehicles.’ The other [community member] will say, ‘I’ll give you the personnel.’ This group will say, ‘I’ll feed those people to keep them going.’ And the other one will say, ‘I’ll make sure those machines are running.’ And then all of you work collaboratively as a team. And then you go right out there and do it and deliver it. Train, set them up [local population], go and then we keep going back and doing QA [Quality Assurance] to the point where they [local population] are really good at it. And they [local population] can do their quality assurance. And then it keeps going.”

To improve collaboration, one SME from an NGO encouraged the CF to reach out because it is “daunting” to initiate engagement. For example, “in terms of communication, there is such a hierarchy of who you need to speak to and letter goes here first before it gets to the head of the field mission or to so-and-so.” Because of the hierarchical nature of the military system, then, this participant argued that it was important that the CF initiate outreach.

Another SME from an NGO mentioned that capacity of CF leadership to engage was good. She stated that “the Americans might criticize the CF leadership in terms of being a bit too much like diplomats...But they are actually really good in a situation like Afghanistan. It’s perfect...We have learned...that the only way to figure out what is going on in that country is to talk to people and to talk to even the most unsavoury people...We don’t necessarily think everyone’s the enemy right off the bat...Now the American machinery is coming around...But the Canadians always did that.”

Despite the advice to engage, the flow of information from the military institution may be partly contingent upon the current tone in Ottawa. As one SME from the media explained, “In 2006 and 2007, in covering Kandahar, it was...much easier...you could pretty much get what you were looking for with a little persistence... Starting late last year, early this year, it doesn’t matter how much nagging that you do...there has been such a severe clamp down on information that it gets very tough to be able to tell anything out of there... Here in Ottawa on either the Political or the Civilian Defence side have determined that...there are two or three story lines that they want to tell and that’s it. And if your request for information falls outside of their message tracks, forget it...Often, institutionally, what they try to do is they will try to shut you down by saying that whatever question you’re asking them, ‘That’s operational security [OPSEC]. That’s OPSEC’...My answer usually is ‘That’s bullshit!’ ...and proceed to explain to them why.” This diminished flow of information at the systems level will have an impact on the ability to collaborate on the ground.

There was some SME agreement that the flow of information may be contingent on a cumbersome military system. A few SMEs working for NGOs described how challenging it is to gain

information in the military system. Specifically, one described the laborious process to learn about security in a particular area in Afghanistan in order to deliver food or visit a client. He explained,

“It was sometimes so much energy to get that information that you would just go anyway. The amount of leg work that had to be done in terms of having a billion meetings with them, going to the PRTs or whatever was there before the PRTs, the bases, having a bunch of meetings with them, which were always very nice and you'd have dinner and they would try and woo you over, and you still had to meet with 10,000 people because again the personnel is changing so much. And each personnel has to be re-briefed from my point of view on each thing. And when you finally get to the commander, he is more interested in just chatting with you as an NGO because he is bored. Well that is the perception that an NGO has.”

From the non-military SME perspective, having to navigate through a complex military system and to explain one's needs to multiple military personnel can hinder collaboration.

Another SME from an NGO stated that *“Not everybody knows how to access these channels [of communication]...So that's a barrier to the culture for them...You don't know how to ask them [for assistance], who to call. When the CF is on deployment, who do you call? It's so secretive...if they just made themselves more accessible through information...it would be just easier...They just need a liaison for NGOs and that would be it...if they knew what their mandate was...what they could help NGOs with, it would be easier. But then, NGOs have to do the same thing...”* There was good evidence from the discussions, then, that systems or channels should be established to further enable interaction between those who require information and those who have the authority to provide it. This will facilitate better collaboration between the CF and the public domain.

According to SMEs, therefore, what seemed to work well in civil-military collaboration was having open and transparent dialogue. This was facilitated by a general understanding of one's collaboration partner and the organization he or she represents. Moreover, a few civilian participants encouraged the CF to engage with the organizations within the public sphere that would broaden their understanding of the operational context and the diversity of players.

However, data suggests that sharing information and communication may be a challenge between the public and CF. That is, transparency may not always be possible. For example, one CF SME mentioned that the particular IO he was working with was very particular regarding information or intelligence gathering. He said that *“the [IO] was very cognizant of and hampered by in [place] was the mantra that they repeated, ‘The [IO] does not gather intelligence.’ And I ran afoul of that several times because I was told that what I was doing was verging on intelligence gathering. Intelligence/information, you can debate the semantics of the two terms all day. So they were very cognizant of that... A lot of things were stove piped to avoid it being seen that the [IO] was gathering intelligence. Although perspectives wise to me, it was a force protection matter. It should be shared widely across the board.”*

Having knowledge of each other's intentions is also important to facilitate communication. At the same time, participants argued that gaining information from the CF should be made more accessible than it is currently.

3.1.2 Negotiation

Based on their experiences of collaborating in a JIMP operational context, SMEs shared advice concerning the styles and approaches required to promote effective collaboration. They provided

examples of “ice breakers” and introductory offerings to build relationships at the start of negotiations, and underscored the importance of listening to the other’s concerns and interests as a way of acknowledging all parties’ contribution (i.e., expertise and experience) to the collaboration.

Building Positive Relationships from the Outset

A few SMEs spoke of ways in which they “break the ice” with their negotiation counterparts. For example, one CF SME suggested establishing common ground with his counterpart. He explained, *“I’m a city boy...I didn’t know nothing about farming. However, my uncle has an apple farming business...so when somebody is in the agricultural NGO business and they come in, we chit chat. I always try to throw a little, ‘Oh my uncle has an apple farming, and he has a beehive soup, you know, put the pollen in the trees stuff. Are you guys doing stuff like that with your tree farming thing here in Afghanistan?’ ‘Oh yeah that’s a good point because we haven’t covered that yet, so oh yeah, really oh.’ And then right away he’s like ‘Hey yeah, we’re similar.’”*

He also described hosting events as another way to break down barriers between the CF and NGOs and establish relationships. For example, he held barbecues for NGOs as a means of developing rapport and providing military “updates.” He explained, *“Thursday is a steak night for us usually, so we usually make it steak night. So they all come because it’s hard to get steak...North American food...when you’re in Afghanistan...I always set it up where they don’t leave empty handed...I always have the maps with all the mine traces...it’s like on my kid’s birthday, right. They leave with a bag of... you know updated traces, security threat briefs and all this and they get maps and all this good stuff. So they usually show up. They don’t have to speak. They can just come for a free meal, get the bags or whatever and leave...so just to get the ball rolling, that’s kinda what I usually do, I usually do an open house.”*

CF/NGO relations could also be furthered by ensuring that one does not inquire too quickly into the other’s business. The same CF SME said that he is very cautious about trying to elicit information from NGOs too early in their relationship. His approach is to develop relationships and build trust. He said that he would never directly ask NGOs questions. He argued that *“I think I discredit myself if I specifically start pointing fingers and asking questions...I throw it out there and if you want to tell me anything...But I will not ask them specifically ‘Where are you operating?’ I won’t, because the second I do that then ‘What are you up to? Why do you want to know?’”* Failure to take this approach may make NGOs’ “defensive,” i.e., “*‘Why do you want to know this? What’s going on?’*”

Another participant from an IO noted the importance of minimizing personal opinions when working collaboratively with other partners. He suggested that negotiation could be problematic if individuals introduce their “personal opinions.” To counter some of his less experienced colleagues’ potential for this, he tells them to “*pass on your personal opinions to me or amongst our group after working hours, but not when you are in your job.... It’s what I call professionalism...shut up when you have to shut up... You cannot always hide your personal emotions, but you have to know when you have to stop.*” He emphasized that listening “very politely” to your negotiation counterpart’s “concerns” and “problems” is central to negotiations. Only after that point is it appropriate to move to “*the things that you want to discuss,*” adding that this approach is “*very respected.*” Evidence suggests that listening to the others’ interests helps you understand your counterpart’s potential contribution to the negotiation. He continued that the CF knew his organization’s position well and this helped cultivate a professional relationship. He said that “*they understand our position. I think they know our position, they know our limitations...and that actually makes it also a professional relationship that I like very much.*” With this basis of

common understanding, when disagreements did arise, he argued that these concerns would simply be revisited at another meeting with no ill will.

Other SMEs from the public sphere shared examples of how they build relationships with the CF. For example, one participant from the media explained that he puts something on the table at the introductions. He explained, *“I bring cigars. I bring Tim Horton’s. I showed up...with like a box full of like cookie dough and two dozen Tim Horton’s donuts from KAF [Kandahar Air Field]...work[s] like a charm.”* Another NGO participant said, *“when I was in Pakistan I happened to see some communications kit for one of the... Lieutenant Colonels there...So I emailed a friend of mine, who’s in the Forces and said, ‘Do you know this guy?’ And the guy is like, ‘Yeah.’ I said, ‘Get me his email.’ So he gets me his email, and I email and I say, ‘Oh, by the way your comms kit is here.’ The guy is like, ‘Oh, thanks a lot...I’ve been waiting for that for two days.’ I’m like ‘Oh, I’m looking at it. Do you want me to bring it to you? Do you want to come get it?’ Now, I’ll guarantee you that if I want something out of this guy, I have a better chance of getting it simply because I took the time to call him and tell him, ‘Oh, I saw your comms kit in customs’ right. Now that’s just the way we operate because we don’t mind helping them out because we want something in the end.”*

One challenge that may impact relationship building is the CF’s use of relatively short rotations. As one Afghan national explained, *“I at least saw three rotos of Canadian Forces coming in and going out. So a great challenge was to instantly build a relationship with newcomers and to ensure that they understand what was happening in Kandahar in terms of development and what the next, you know, strategy of development is and how they should be aligned their work to that strategy. So that was a great challenge.”* This was mitigated by *“reach[ing] out to them...[holding]...weekly coordination meetings...to ensure they know we are there and exist, and that they are aware of our projects and what we are doing so that we can now find duplication of efforts so that we can, you know, harmonize and coordinate on what we are doing and you know, the best way to utilize each other’s resources...to some extent, I think we succeeded.”* This participant provided a good example of how existing systems could be altered slightly to help facilitate relationship building and better collaboration.

Acknowledging Negotiation Counterparts’ Expertise and Experience

For people in the public sphere (most notably the NGO community), having evidence of the CF’s acknowledgment of their expertise and experience during negotiations seemed to have impacted positively on collaboration. For example, one NGO SME, who worked in Bosnia in the late 1990s, explained that her role as a civilian was to provide advice and expertise to military personnel. She said,

“We’d have the commander of a battalion come up and say, ‘You know, I have lots of money. I can’t really talk to these groups, because I do not know who’s who...’ That was a fault of the forces, all of them, they had money and they had to spend it quickly because they knew that they had a 6-month rotation in there and they had to spend the budget by then. ‘So what roads can we build? What can we do?’ So the CIMIC [Civil-Military Cooperation] was very classic. And we would sort of advise them on projects that would be helpful to stabilize a community. Like this community is way remote out there. They don’t have any access to supplies and so basically the insurgents bring them supplies... there weren’t insurgents then, but the radicals or whatever. So in that regard we had this kind of cooperation...”

She continued,

“The guys patrolling around, there was a Canadian group and there is a Swedish group, and they said, ‘You know, we’re always traveling around and people are always asking us...human rights or legal questions, and we can’t answer them. We just send them to your office.’ But this particular area we were in was within my AOR [Area of Responsibility] but it was so far away that I got out there maybe once every 2 months. So they said, ‘What if we set up a place. We will rent a place and we will provide coffee and food, and you just send your guys here twice a week to sit and hear cases.’ So then we opened this...OSCE-CIMIC [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Balkans] house in the northern part of Bosnia, and it was quite a successful project.”

In the preceding examples, the CF acknowledged and understood their counterparts’ capacities and expertise to contribute to the situation, which led to successful collaboration between civil and military actors.

However, other examples provided by participants also indicated the failure of CF personnel to acknowledge the skills and capacity of partners. For example, one SME from an NGO said, *“you know, there’s some guys who join the military, and women too, that will have the mind of ‘I’m here. I’m the big peacekeeper. I’m, you know, solve the problem and there’s only one solution and it’s mine. I have the gun’... You know, the response to that is ‘Good luck. Thanks. Bye.’ And then they go back to their Commander and their Commander says, ‘Okay, I need that information. Make nice.’ But they’ve already started off on a bad foot and you know they almost have to send someone else at that stage.”*

Another participant from an NGO, while considering CF participation in the humanitarian domain, offered the following complaint: *“It has been the NGO...You know, it’s been their domain. They would legitimately resent military coming in and doing it without asking, without, you know, paying their dues, because it’s a huge insult for somebody to come in, where somebody has been doing something, and not ask them, you know, ‘What are the pitfalls? Where have you had successes?’ and those kinds of things... Nobody likes to be told how to do their job...”* He concluded that, rather than approach the negotiation as a ‘know it all,’ *“the truly successful ones are going to seek counsel,”* acknowledging and essentially leveraging the NGOs’ expertise and experience, and even combining it with their own.

Another SME from an NGO, who was an ex-CF member, mentioned that *“where you get military guys, military officers, for example, together with a bunch of aid agencies in the field, the military guys instantly, you know if they are given a task, a humanitarian task, the military guys instantly want to take over and say, ‘Okay guys, this is the way we’re going to do it.’ But they don’t ask the humanitarian guy who has actually done this work, ‘How did you guys do it? How did you execute it?’ They don’t ask, ‘How did you guys do this in the past?’”* According to this SME, this negotiation approach (*“‘We’re taking charge and we’re in charge guys!’”*) fails to uncover the interests of the other parties involved, which essentially *“isolate[s] the NGO community and...the humanitarian community, because they go, ‘Well, you’re totally not interested in what our goal is.’”* Further, failure to consider the other parties’ interests may prevent creative problem solving and integrative solutions. By examining others’ interests (needs, desires, concerns, fears) more thoroughly and not fixating merely on one’s own position and how to accomplish the task, negotiating partners can locate compatible interests as well as create solutions to meet those interests (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). Unfortunately, as the SME recalled, *“the military comes with an attitude a lot of the time that the civilians have nothing to teach us.”* The assertive and demanding approach, he argued, is firmly entrenched in the CF organizational structure, stating that *“military people are trained to react in a certain way. And I’m not sure if there’s a great deal*

of flexibility. You're always going to want to have that take charge leadership in the military leader. But I think there has to be an understanding." He argued that the take-charge attitude was extreme in Afghanistan, because anything falling outside the CF and Government of Canada "parameters" meant that the CF was "not keen" on helping out NGOs. In other words, the CF was focused on enabling its Whole of Government (WoG) partners (i.e., Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Correctional Service of Canada) and not the NGO community. The result, he explained, is that as an NGO in such a non-permissive environment like Afghanistan, "you can't function."

He provided another example of when the CF was insulated from the other players in operations, and this, he recalled, led to tense and suspicious interactions:

"We were doing an intelligence brief on where we were going to take our helicopters into [place] to do some extractions. And long story short, the int [intelligence] officers...got this big poster on the wall and it's an old DND [Department of National Defence] map of [place] from 1978...I sort of put up my hand and I said, 'Well, those are not DLZs [drop landing zones] that we have.' And instantly it was a comment like... 'What the hell is this civvie doing in here and what security clearance does he have and who does he think he is to tell us.' And that was literally this thing that came out. And I said, 'Well okay.' And I pulled out my little map which was a satellite image and I stuck it up and I said 'Those are the jetties that aren't on your map and they are there now and those are our LZ [landing zone] points.' She says, 'Well, how did you come by this information?' I said, 'Google Earth.' But there was an attitude...there, 'You're civilian and we're in a military operation here. We have OPSEC going on and all this other sort of stuff.' And it really closed down on their ability to communicate with the NGO community as a whole. To the point where I was frustrated because the helicopters that we were using were civilian assets and technically they were being contracted by DFAIT. But DND had sort of control of the assets. One of the guys said, 'Well he's a former CF, he's former infantry.' And she [CF Officer] said, 'Well he's a civvie now and as far as I'm concerned, he's got no clearance to be in here and be part of this.'"

The SME continued, "I was really shocked at just how...little integration the CF had with the UN [United Nations] community...the NGO community that was there. There was almost none. They moved into [place], they set up an operational cell in one of the hotels, and then they sort of Balkanized themselves... They had their internal int cell and then they had their operational cell, and it became very sort of this crunch down on information. And no information was supposed to go out." This is an extreme example of where the CF refused to recognize and/or solicit the input of those from the public sphere during operations.

In some cases, however, gaining recognition simply requires persuading and convincing the military of one's own expertise and capacity. One SME from an NGO described a situation in which he had to negotiate with the military for use of their assets (i.e., helicopters, boats, etc.) in order to provide humanitarian aid to populations devastated by an earthquake and tsunami. He said,

"We were in the Solomon Islands for a series of earthquakes that triggered a tsunami, and there's all these villages that are isolated that don't have clean water and we've got portable systems that can go in... We know that we have got the right tools to fix the job. They [the military] are getting requests from everybody to go in to fix the job. But everybody just has people and clipboards. And we are like, 'No, no, don't put people and clipboards in. Put tools in that can fix it. And, we can be the people in clipboards that go in

and install it and get you your intel...and we are bargaining to them or bartering to them, why we're more important than someone else to go in. And once we show them what we have, we have convinced them that 'Yes, this is the right idea.' And then of course they will give us all their military assets for the next 3, 4 days...all the helicopter lifts, all the movements, so we can get all our gear deployed, still accomplish the tasks they need, because they are tasked by their government to get a needs assessment of what is done. But anybody knows, what good is a needs assessment if you're not actually delivering aid, right, which is the opinion we take...So you can help them come up with a reasonable compromise, right? Because there is nothing worse than being the big kid in the sandbox, right, but you're not getting anything done because nobody is giving you anything to go fix. You've got all this ability to move tents and food and what have you, but nobody is giving you the stuff to move, right?"

In this instance, the SME persuaded the military to provide assistance to his organization because he had demonstrated its capacity to both deliver aid and gather information, essentially doing “two jobs at once.” His success at negotiation may be characterized as exercising rational persuasion and consulting his counterpart. Once persuaded, he continued, “they [the military] will do everything it takes to get you through and it's done... If they are given their orders to move you and your gear, it is all they are gonna do...”

However, persuading military personnel may be challenging as a result of context. Describing the challenges he faced communicating his interests to the CF in Afghanistan, one Afghan national stated, “They don't want to be stuck in this bureaucratic jargon that we had to go through... We have very strict standard procedures that have to be followed in order to, to approve a project and complete a project. For them, it was case in hand, ‘Tell me...what to do and we should start it right away.’ I mean convincing them that it takes time and we should identify the priority first, instead of implementing it, was a great challenge. And, in addition...they were superior in the PRT...at the end of the day, it was a military institution not a civilian institution. So they were superior in terms of deciding what they should do in order to advance security to insecure areas...so for us to make our case was not an easy job...and we tried very hard.”

Speaking of the military forces in her area of operations, one NGO SME said that to ensure effective collaboration, “they [the military] try to bring us together...to understand more about what each NGO is doing and whereabouts...the collaboration is easier when they understand what we're doing...they also have some sort of a system that for all NGOs operating in [place]...they can send out...news to the country manager, and then the country manager will filter it down to the rest of their staff, which is quite beneficial...” Again, making an effort to gain a broad understanding of one's negotiation counterpart appears to promote effective collaboration in the long term.

According to participants, members of the NGO community also need to acknowledge the input and the value of the CF as a collaborative partner. Participants felt that NGO personalities and military personalities are sometimes similar, which may negatively impact negotiation from the start. For example, as one SME from an NGO explained, “over here the people [NGOs] are highly driven and often, unfortunately, highly idealistic and make statements that are not always diplomatic, even though they believe that they are the centre of diplomacy. And so NGO people, I think could be very difficult to work with. You know, you put those together [NGO and military] you almost have to...expect conflict.” To mitigate this, he suggested that NGOs should examine “the strengths of the military” and not be “threatened by something that is different.”

Another SME from an IO spoke of the challenges of working with people who have very different perspectives on the world. However, to mitigate this, he said,

“I think the fact that I work for a neutral organization...for an organization that really has an operational posture of neutrality/impartiality, that helps me quite a lot to manage this...As I work for these organizations that definitely have to talk to all kinds of people...that actually helps me a great deal to keep a balance, okay. Because I know that I discuss certain things with the Canadians, with the Americans, with the Dutch, with the Australians and I also discuss certain things with the Taliban...That, I think, helps me to balance it out a little bit.”

As indicated by the SME quoted above, exposure to diverse positions and interests impacts the ability to negotiate the challenges emerging from different cultural and national backgrounds, different organizations, and different procedures and expectations. One Afghan SME suggested that when working on the base with the CF, it was important to “*comply with general rules and procedures, negotiate with transparency, diplomatically correct any misunderstandings or reach out and explain why you think it is wrong.*” This approach shows respect for the CF organization (i.e., its structure, systems, and culture) and demonstrates a willingness to negotiate honestly and in good faith.

A number of SME responses, both military and civilian, suggest that when working together, understanding the concerns, interests, and competencies of one’s counterpart and adapting one’s approach to negotiations will ultimately improve collaboration. This is consistent with negotiation research suggesting that integrated outcomes demand the input of all parties to arrive at an optimal resolution (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Utilizing all parties’ expertise and experience should lead to more collaboration and integrated negotiation outcomes.

3.1.3 Planning and Decision making

Planning and decision making are critical elements in negotiation. One CF SME believed that the CF is well trained in planning, whereas his counterparts (e.g., NGOs, contractors, etc.), based on his own experience, are not as well versed in this activity. This perception led him to use a “*worst-case scenario*” when making assumptions about the skills of his NGO counterparts. He explained, “*We come up with a plan, and when we meet these agencies or groups in the field and we’re there to support them, we always have a plan to present to them as a likely good-result type plan and it becomes their plan... We’ll submit it to them if their plan is junk or if they don’t have one, and then we’ll say ‘Hey, this is an option if you want to go that way.’ And then we tweak it to make...[it]...their plan right, and then we support their plan knowing that there’s a high-likelihood of success because the military has the resources and the investment capital to train their people... For me as an army guy is to always have that contingency plan and be ready to initiate it.*” This SME’s strategy is to be “*the friendly guy*” in order to remove the “*threatening perception*” or “*stereotype*” of “*the army guy*.” Only then will he “*introduce a potential option,*” but only incrementally, so that “*they start filling in the rest.*” He explained, “*I’ll just initiate some ideas...keep it open-ended. And as they start filling in the blanks...they say ‘Hey, that’s a good idea... How do you want to do that?’ And I just kinda...[say]... ‘Oh, I’ve got guys that can do that for ya, if ya want that.’ And I just...rolled a story along...from the rear. And at the end of the day, they get their credit.*” He concluded, “*The army’s not about getting the credit. The army is about enabling them to get the job.*” Working to ensure that counterparts, who were perceived to have less planning capacity than the CF, had adequate plans while preserving their sense of contribution, is a very interesting strategy in collaboration.

Preparation was identified by some SMEs as critical for negotiations, especially given the fast-paced tempo of operations. One SME from an IO commented that success comes when you share an agenda of items in advance, address these, and do not waste time. Working with the CF in Afghanistan, this SME stated, *“These people are very busy...I mean, this is a war zone here, and I know that during 1 hour, I have to pass on a lot of messages, okay. I have to go straight to the point. Agenda – point, point, point... We will email them our agenda so they can prepare themselves and we can prepare ourselves. And I think it’s also how you behave.”*

Data also suggested that during collaboration, negotiators should be empowered by their organization. For example, one SME from an IO said *“I think it’s about transparency. And they [CF] were very clear about their limitations and mandates...And I think that helps. There’s not this sort of big secrecy of ‘I have to go back to my Commander.’ And I found people came very well prepared to meetings and had authority to act, and I find that makes a big difference.”* This implies that effective negotiation requires individuals who are empowered by their organization to make decisions, without continuous reach back.

Data also suggested that the CF should negotiate fairly with a broad range of people in theatre to avoid generating misperceptions and potentially negative consequences among local populations. For example, considering efforts to stimulate the local economy in Afghanistan, one Afghan SME mentioned that financial contributions ought to be equally distributed to have a lasting impact on the local population. It is, he said,

“very important...to give equal opportunity, especially with sub-contracts, with working with local companies. To open up the door to everyone and to have equal opportunities in terms of who your partner is. Because for most Afghans, this foreign aid, this government assistance is the key source of their income. And so usually what you see is some warlords, some key contractors making millions of dollars from martyr’s money and then ending up taking this money to either the UK [United Kingdom], the US [United States], Dubai and buying houses and you don’t really see any impact on the local population... If you can give opportunities to everyone and to different parties, I think that will have a substantial impact on the local population.”

The SME quoted above suggested that unfair distribution leads to ill will: *“Lots of people are jealous...a lot of crimes because people who make millions without a right. People...don’t like it...they become criminals.”* As such, decisions made by the CF to fund contractors in an operation such as Afghanistan need to be justly distributed in order to avoid alienating the local population.

In some cases, the CF members were required to put pressure on NGOs (or local contractors working for the CF) when negotiating contracts. For example, one CF SME said that he had to provide ultimatums to “host nation” NGOs or “contractors” (as opposed to the big “international” NGOs like the UN, Save the Children, etc.) to ensure that deliverables were met. He shared the kind of dialogue that he used to exert this pressure: *“You will have it done by 4 pm. Not 4:01. 4 pm. You can have it early, and if you do, I think we might be able to do business in the future. But if you can’t get it done by 4, that doesn’t look good, then we’re questioning how effective and reliable you are. You know what I mean?”* When the CF is responsible for delivering, he further explained that he would always have a “contingency plan” or a “work around” to ensure that *“they reach their end state.”* Pressure was necessary to ensure project completion. Only then, he added, would they get paid.

Overall, participants provided strong recommendations for civil-military collaboration. One core issue was a failure to recognize the expertise and experience of one’s negotiation counterpart. In

fact, it may be argued that the diverse organizations in the field do not have a very good understanding of one another and that this may frustrate civil-military collaboration. To learn about one another, participants emphasized open dialogue and engagement. Building positive relationships were also considered an important strategy for effective collaboration, which is consistent with previous research (Thomson et al., 2010).

3.2 Whose Jurisdiction? Defining Roles and Responsibilities

In operations as diverse as humanitarian relief efforts (e.g., Haiti), peace-keeping (e.g., Darfur), or combat and nation-building (e.g., Afghanistan), determining the CF's role and responsibilities will be critical to avoid unnecessary power struggles that may frustrate collaboration among the various players in theatre. Indeed, as one SME from an NGO mentioned, from the outset of the mission, each should understand the other's particular "role" in the operation as well as their "assets," and this will facilitate collaboration. In contrast to a combat mission, where the CF will assume a primary lead, in humanitarian crisis operations, one NGO SME said that no one in the CF "wants to be the one to take that responsibility to lead, right?" He continued, "So, for example, if the CF has engineers that can fix a water project somewhere, they are not gonna sit there and say 'Let's go do this' as the leader. They want someone to come and task them with it...because then they are being asked. They are being brought in..." On the other hand, NGO members may not want to be directed by the military. One NGO SME said, "I think the problem that I have personally in Afghanistan was that yeah, you had a very clear understanding that as far as the military is concerned, this was their operation and you as an NGO will do what that PRT team wants you to do. And that doesn't...jive with the humanitarian community." Working out these roles and responsibilities is critical, but as the following participant responses suggest, this remains a challenge in current operations.

One SME representing an IO in Afghanistan described an experience that he had with military personnel overstepping their jurisdiction into development issues and their attempts to essentially hijack the process. He recalled the situation in the following way:

"They said 'Well, we need more coordination in development here.' I said, 'No we don't because coordination means you're going to coordinate me and I don't want to be coordinated. I want to collaborate, but I do not wish to be coordinated.' Anyways, she turned to me and I said '...we're always ready to talk to you. We're always ready to come and discuss with you, always ready to look at indicators and things like that. However...every organization...that's around this table have their own indicators and this is what we work on and this is what we try to identify every year...to do...And we do not think, I do not think, it is appropriate for you to try and come in here and tell me what my indicators should be. If you are to talk to me and discuss what our indicators are and how you can use us, that's wonderful. If you want to create a new set of indicators, then you're barking up the wrong tree. Come and talk to us and we will put you right.'"

He justified his reaction to this desire of the military to coordinate his organization's efforts as the military "trespassing on development." He said,

"They were assuming that since development hadn't worked, they were going to make it work. And after 30 years of doing monitoring and evaluation, I know that it's not that simple...Just because you've got a uniform on, just because you work for a General, don't come in here and think you're going to get it right."

The SME quoted above believed that although the military lacked capacity in the development domain, they wanted to take charge, largely because Afghanistan is a war zone. In this situation, he did not consent to their authority. Rather, he challenged the military's credibility in the development domain, and its legitimacy to speak for the local community. He inferred that the military would have profited from working with those organizations whose specific mandate is development and by embracing their level of expertise and experience. With the passing of time, he did report a major shift in attitude. There was a shift from, "How you developers have done it, have not got it right, get out of the way" to "We can't get out of here until you do get it right" or "We help you in whatever way we can. So tell us how we can work together and, and let's try and let's work at working together so that we can each fulfil our functions."

One Afghan provided another example of the military overstepping its jurisdiction in development projects without proper consultation with development experts:

"In some cases, I think they [CF] wanted to be independent. They wanted to have the authority to make decisions... They didn't want...to be interrupted...to be told that, 'No, you shouldn't do that.' They didn't want to hear that. They wanted to have complete jurisdiction, complete authority over their work... That was an area, I think, needed some more attention...although they do a good job with research, with understanding the local area and making sure that the projects they have are the right ones. But in a situation like Afghanistan, I think they had to listen more to people. They had to learn to hide their ideas, especially from civilian institutions, and to make sure that...the work they are doing is done based on proper stakeholder analysis and based on the concept of everyone, local authorities, innocent civilians, and the PRT."

He added that as a consequence of the quick rotations "the line of responsibility and the line of authority was not clear." The failure to consult collaboration counterparts and simply take charge of operations outside the CF's typical jurisdiction seems to have been construed as a misuse of CF power and as a desire to control other organizations and their activities within CF areas of responsibility. For example, one IO SME believed that the WoG approach was a means of co-opting the NGO community in Afghanistan in order to shed light on which NGOs are "potentially soft or infiltrated." In her words,

"This whole of government thing...is all a way to...co-opt NGOs into sort of being in this Whole of Government system, so that the Whole of Government people, which is DFAIT and also the military, know who they are dealing with. Right? So they know that this NGO is clean, meaning that this NGO gets money directly from the government, so it kind of has obligations to the Canadian government. It does not have divided loyalties between the community it is serving. It is not a like wishy-washy NGO...and they are...creating all of these databases, so that everybody knows what project is going on. So then the CF can go, 'Okay this NGO is here doing this and that.' It is all very clear. And this means you're getting much more mainstream and mediocre NGOs....who are as disinterested as a government bureaucrat is...in really doing something there. So you're going to lose some of the...quality of NGO work in the process... The financial structure has changed...you have to comply with whatever the framework this Whole of Government group comes up with... Some NGOs just don't apply for that... The danger with the Whole of Government approach in Canada is that...there are very few Canadian NGOs. It is not hard to co-opt them. Canadian NGOs have always been pretty mainstream."

This opinion of an IO member speaks to a core lack of trust about the true intention of the WoG concept and its fundamental raison d'être. SMEs showed very little consistency about the issue of

current civil-military relations. A few thought that the CF was making some ground. For example, one SME from an IO mentioned that the CF is at least acknowledging the need to “engage” the civilian side of operations, a “priority.” As one NGO SME stated, *“I think the [CF] culture is moving more and more towards inclusiveness and the realisation that, you know, ‘We can’t win the war alone.’”* Indeed, counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine demands involvement with civilians and NGOs, while in theatre. However, it was also pointed out that “certain commanders” in the CF may not be “convinced” of this paradigm shift. Moreover, one IO SME said that she did not think that *“the CF is any different than any other force in that area [Afghanistan] who is saying, ‘Look we’re going to implement with people we know can work and implement the program and spend the money well and who don’t have any qualms about complying with our security restrictions.’ I think this spirit of civil-military whatever is completely changed in Afghanistan. I just hope it doesn’t get duplicated in any other country. In other countries, where there isn’t such an insecure environment, I hope the classic NGOs with their development agendas and vision about how to do things remain...I’m hoping that the reason why this has emerged this way in Afghanistan is because of the security stress and insecurity.”* One CF participant mentioned that (at the time of the meeting) there was an army course being run at his base, but there were no personnel from civilian agencies and organizations participating. He asked, *“Why aren’t they [civilian organizations] sending somebody down?”*

One CF SME retold his experience of being accused by his collaboration counterparts of overstepping his jurisdiction within a humanitarian relief effort, despite his good intentions. He thought that he could facilitate collaboration between a number of NGOs and IOs operating in theatre. He described his approach, their reaction to him, and the resolution:

“So I hid there, underground. I knew what the...[lead coordinator for relief effort]...and the briefing to the General was that was sitting in the audience, so I knew what the big plan was. When it hit the ground, it kinda went pear-shaped. So I right away decided to do an emergency meeting... ‘Okay, what’s the plan? What’s your direction and what’s your perception of what you’re supposed to do? What’s yours? What’s yours? What’s yours? Hey, we’re all here to save the elderly, the kids, the orphans and the pregnant ladies...those who are getting the food...How are you guys gonna initiate this?’ ...Get them to vocalize what the common purpose was and try to get them to come to an agreement...to do the same type of function...At the end of the day they fluffed me off because they didn’t want to see an army guy asking those questions...I had nothing to contribute to the aid delivery other than all of their transport. I was the helicopter guy who brought them down and I was bringing their equipment and that’s how they perceived the army. They were the expert with no training, reading the SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures] from the pamphlet, so I said, ‘Alright. Whatever. If that’s what you feel’ ... When I approached them, they felt threatened. They said ‘Oh you’re just trying to push us aside.’ It was the opposite. It was ‘I’m trying to get you to tell me what you’re doing, so I don’t interfere with your operation.’ And after 5 minutes of them, you know, being the peacock and sticking their chest out, and they saw that I was a non-threat to their activities, well then they were like, ‘Oh you can help me on this one?’ ‘Yeah, want me to send them your way...or are you gonna send them my way?’ ‘It’s your decision. I’m indifferent. I’m gonna help you.’ And after they saw that I was actually not telling them what to do, but I was asking ‘What you want me to do to help you,’ then the barriers came down.”

Those in the public sphere may have a hard time seeing the CF in a role other than warfighting. As one NGO SME stated *“a military’s objective is to war fight. And anyone who thinks it’s different is kidding themselves.”* Although the CF member in the preceding example managed to establish his

role (and by extension the CF's role) in the relief effort, determining roles in advance of collaboration seems critical to optimal collaboration. If this is not possible, then the CF may benefit from identifying this issue as a probable challenge and by learning how to train techniques that assist its representatives to diplomatically confront and resolve this issue in operations. Failing that, simply offering help and agreeing to be directed by other partners on the ground might promote more integrated solutions in humanitarian missions. Regardless, the main recommendation seems to be for the CF to communicate that it sees itself in a supportive role in the humanitarian context, rather than in a leading role. For example, one SME from an NGO described collaborative activities with the CF in responding to the flood in Pakistan. He said,

"I worked with them [CF] directly in the coordination cell. We would work as a group, each representative from each NGO and agency and UN group. We would work as a coordination team. So they were actually integrated with us. And we found the, in that case, we found the support that they gave, the logistical expertise, the complex sort of operational management expertise their people brought into that unit was really good. And I think because it wasn't particularly, except for the geo-political context of it being northwest frontier province of Pakistan, it was a more straightforward humanitarian operation. So...their integration was more on a complementary side. They were like, 'Look guys, we're here to support you. We're here to help you out and be part of the system.'"

Knowing one's role and responsibility as well as one's jurisdiction is also necessary for personnel within the public sphere. As one NGO SME recalled, *"there also has to be a real understanding from our side as humanitarians as to what our objectives are. And our objectives are not to be force multipliers. Our objectives are not to be counter insurgency amplifiers for their [CF] operations. That is not what we're there for. As long as the strategists consider that the humanitarian's role, which is a relatively new concept, the two sides are not going to gel very well."*

In one instance, the CF thought that an NGO was overstepping its jurisdiction. One NGO SME recalled the animosity that resulted from his organization's capacity to support JTF2 [Joint Task Force 2] operations with helicopters. He explained that,

"There was this real animosity, real sort of, 'This guy's a civvie and he doesn't have a right to be here and what's he doing here, and everything else.' Some of the Air Force officers, to be honest, I think were exceptionally pissed off that their Griffins were not doing the work when there were civilian assets doing work. The fact is...I can get civilian assets for the operation within 2 hours anywhere in the world... They had a grudge...they were sort of like, 'This should be an Air Force op. This should be Griffins.' When the very fact is, they didn't understand...the whole reason of going to civilian assets in that role was to have a low profile. The government didn't necessarily want Canadian Forces' Griffins going in and out of [place] on a daily basis. So there was a lack of understanding..."

The preceding examples demonstrate the importance of establishing roles and responsibilities during operations requiring a high degree of interaction and collaboration between multiple diverse stakeholders. Rather than indicating an inequality in power, however, SME reactions to other organizations overstepping their jurisdiction seemed to reflect a refusal to accept the right of particular organizations to exercise authority in a particular domain of expertise that is not considered their traditional area of expertise (e.g., the CF in humanitarian/development matters; NGOs/IOs in providing material assets). On the other hand, legitimate exercises of power were welcomed, as these were seen as linked to acting within one's area of expertise. For example, one

SME working for an NGO felt reassured in hostile environments that the CF could “provide a certain level of security to us patriots.” She continued,

“When things are volatile, it’s nice to know that there’s this presence there that will not only try to secure the community in general, but will be able to assist you. Because as much as I enjoy my work, I also need to have a sense of personal security and I believe my family also expects that of me, so it’s nice to know that there’s a military backing that you’ve got a standing relationship with if things are to be a problem...security wise, medical wise, evacuation wise... If they’re able to fit us in and assist us, that’s always given me peace of mind, which makes it easier to do the job I do.”

This indicates a willing acceptance to be protected by the CF within potentially insecure contexts.

Based on SME discussions, the core power struggle emerged from unsuccessful attempts to take on roles and responsibilities that lay outside of one’s professional mandate and expertise. These instances may also make one’s professional (or social) identity more salient and distinct from those belonging to other groups. As we will see below, individuals are motivated to reinforce the relevance, importance, and distinctiveness of one’s group when it is under pressure from another group, which may lead to distributive negotiated outcomes rather than the preferred integrated outcomes as the literature suggests (Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996). As such, power struggles and identity are closely related.

3.3 Identity

Being a member of a group (or profession) requires one to adopt the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the group, and to act in ways that are consistent with these. Obviously, members of the group will vary with respect to how much they internalize a group’s values, principles, and goals, and in the extent to which they behave in accordance with these values and principles. However, when required to work with another group, strong identification with one’s own group may require reinforcement of this group’s distinctiveness by upholding its values and so on, in contrast to those of other groups. This allows group members to gain or retain social capital during the interaction (Turner, 2005).

In the present study, there was evidence of civilian SMEs actively reinforcing their unique identities while collaborating with the CF in theatre. The central identity threat raised by non-military SMEs (specifically those representing NGOs and IOs) centred on their group’s need to adhere to the principle of neutrality (i.e., not taking sides in the conflict) and its consequent behaviours. As will be shown below, for some organizations, neutrality was absolutely essential when operating in hostile environments such as Afghanistan or Darfur, where the CF assumes a combat function. This need to maintain neutrality meant that distance or differentiation from the military was critical. As one IO SME said, “*You just have to keep the distance.*” SMEs from the media also reported the need to remain at a distance from members of the CF. Signifying adherence to the professional standards of behaviour expected of members of the media, they spoke of the importance of remaining an impartial observer in order to report the facts of the situation as objectively as possible. On the other hand, a few non-military SMEs spoke of a shared or common identity, which made it easier to work with the CF.

Neutrality and Impartiality

For some organizations, adhering to and acting in accordance with the principle of neutrality (i.e., not taking sides in the conflict) was core to preserving their group identity. In some cases, this

meant that the organization would have little to do with the CF (or any military) in operations. As one SME from an IO stated, *“We’re not in a position to be part of the comprehensive approaches, because we see that it really impinges on our capacity to access people who are most in need.”* She explained that,

“We will engage in bilateral discussions with them [military] because we need...to let them know what it is we’re doing, where we’re working, and to have some kind of agreement that we are where we are. And we do that with all warring parties. So if it’s a Western force or if it’s a rebel group or if it’s a governmental force, we’ll go through the same discussions... You’ve got to be talking to all the parties and you’ve got to keep talking to them to make sure they get why you’re there... And then to make sure that when things come up that we have some links...networking is important... From our perspective the most important thing is to get to where patients who have the greatest medical need are... We think that by aligning ourselves with one group, then we’re automatically limiting our capacity to respond to needs in other parts of a given warzone. So we say that, as much as possible, we maintain our independence...especially when it’s a non-permissive environment, where there are Western forces, because there we’re automatically seen as Western and we can’t easily be linked in. And there we have to have a very strong discourse with the different warring parties that we’re just there for medical need, we’re only a medical organization and we’re not part of the whole comprehensive approaches basically... Humanitarian space is basically access...if we don’t have access, we don’t have humanitarian space... For us it’s all about providing medical services. And we try to do that independent from the military agendas, independent of the political agendas, and just really try to be there for people. So the difficulty comes in the fact that we are a Western-based organization, we came out of the West... As long as we have that Westernness about us, then it becomes very difficult to differentiate ourselves. Because it’s more automatic for people to lump us all together... We have to be really clear and really try to say, ‘Okay they have military agendas, they’re here and we’re here and we have medical agendas and all we want to do is try and help people’...to respond to medical needs that are...really important to the populations, we find that that in of itself can give...some security to the teams because we’re not armed... In most environments, we’re managing without armed escorts or guards and again...that’s to really reinforce the fact that we’re not part of the military agenda.”

She further explained that to maintain her organization’s non-political, non-military identity when negotiating with various factions to a conflict, there is the need to communicate the message that the organization is only there to provide medical care to those in need:

“It’s really just pounding on the message that...we’re only there to provide medical care for their population. And that we are independent and that, you know, in really tight security environments we tend not to take institutional funds...we say... ‘No government funds. It’s all funded privately... We’re privately funded. We’re making all of our own decisions. It’s all about healthcare and...we’re not part of the agenda of Government X or Government Y’... You’ve got to keep pushing on it and help them see...So we try to set our teams up in a way that they can feel strong in their message and know and understand...[and]...stick to the principles of impartiality.”

She underscored that this principle of neutrality would be violated only in rare instances. For example, one exception would be if her and her colleagues’ lives are at risk. She recollected, *“when I was in [place] in ’96, when [place] fell...we have relied on military for evacuations...you don’t*

have much choice.” Another participant working for an IO explained that, despite being skittish about working with the military, in non-permissive environments, it is virtually impossible for NGOs to operate without military support. Based in experience and expertise, she said, “we cannot manage our own security the way it needs to be in a lot of these situations... I don’t see how you cannot interact and not have partnerships going on in places like Darfur, Afghanistan, Pakistan.” In some situations, therefore, NGOs and IOs may be willing to forfeit the principle of neutrality in order to be able to provide humanitarian relief or protect themselves.

Another SME from an IO also indicated that in order for his organization to function, they needed to be understood as neutral to the conflict. He said,

“We...have to explain to all sorts of people that we have a role in talking to armed opposition...Our particular role: neutral, independent, impartial. And we can only operate if all sides accept that we are a neutral organization. And neutral means that we do not take sides...We are not specifically friends with anybody, which is why everybody doesn't like us sometimes... If we just stick with the principles that we have, which are the [organization] principles, and stick with what our role is to work with the victims of conflict, then actually that lays things out quite clearly and it defines things quite well...That neutral, impartial, independent humanitarian aspect is basically what we base everything on...”

One SME from an NGO reflected on his refusal to work with the military: *“In Haiti...where you’ve got a UN presence of peacekeepers that are there to bring law, order, and security, right, to the nation, we generally tend to get away from them, simply because during the earthquake, they were just too bogged down. They are not well perceived in Haiti and they were just more of a target than it was worth...You want to remain neutral.”* Another participant from an NGO said that in Afghanistan to maintain neutrality as best possible, the NGO community has established a safety office that reports security issues. She continued that this information is *“by NGOs for NGOs and it’s not for military purposes.”*

Another NGO SME mentioned the challenges arising from working in a shared space in Afghanistan. He reflected,

“And you had a problem because part of the humanitarian community, their problem is, if you associate with the PRT team...all neutrality goes out the window. You are basically saying, ‘I’m part of this warfighting team really.’ And whether we say, ‘No! No! We’re humanitarians and we’re doing the reconstruction’...That’s not the way it is perceived. And I think the problem you have is a humanitarian agency is in a place like Afghanistan, we also can’t operate, we couldn’t operate, without the security of the armed forces. So you have this huge mess going on within the humanitarian world...”

He suggested, however, a means to overcome this potential identity conflict. He said *“the humanitarian community maybe has to get back to...pick and choose their operations, where they say, ‘If I can’t maintain neutrality and impartiality, I’m just not going to go.’”* However, he holds that this is an ideal, and the issue is no longer *“black and white.”*

In fact, one NGO SME argued that the principle of neutrality is actually illusory. This SME thought that *“they [NGOs] are not neutral. They are taking money from governments. Governments have agendas...so there is no neutrality...That argument is horseshit, you know...I understand where they don’t want to have certain perception, and they don’t want to get targeted, especially in a counterinsurgency zone. It is a completely valid point. But the reality is to stand by and do nothing when...[the CF has]...all this capacity to deliver – it’s crummy.”* He also questioned

whether the principle of neutrality was sustainable with the tone of current operations (e.g., COIN, War on Terror). He believed that for both of sides of the parties in conflict, expectations of neutrality (i.e., no association with uniformed soldiers) have changed somewhat. He mentioned that *“pre-9/11...by being neutral, you were wearing...an invisible, bullet proof vest and you would be safe.”* Sharing an anecdote about an NGO colleague who was killed, he argued that, in the post-9/11 theatre of operations, the bullet-proof vest has been doffed. Rather, he thought that NGOs should be willing to ask for valuable CF support in humanitarian efforts, especially when it means providing aid more efficiently and effectively to those in need. The priority, he argued, is that Canada *“should be a world leader in the delivery of aid,”* with the help of the CF when necessary. He supported a *“paradigm shift”* that would redefine the CF as *“less bullet-centric...in terms of generating peace.”*

Nonetheless, the demands of the current operating environment make it difficult for non-military actors to remain neutral to parties in the conflict. As one IO SME argued, the sheer number of NGOs who are willing to receive government assistance threaten this identity. For organizations that need to be perceived as both neutral and distinct, this is particularly worrisome. She continued,

“We’re not being seen differently...in some contexts. There’s more and more actors. You have a number of NGOs who are willing to be subcontracted by governments or militaries to function...NGO...that term means nothing... It’s being labelled that creates a confusion, because so many different groups will use that term and meanwhile the agenda can be so different. So we find if we can just keep a very simple objective: save lives, alleviate suffering, keep...as unique...as possible and keep the discourse going on a bilateral basis, whether it’s with other NGOs or with militaries or with political actors, whoever, that we’re more likely to be able to keep teams in the environments where we’re working.”

She also expressed concerns about the military providing humanitarian aid and *“co-opting”* the aid worker’s language. For example, in Afghanistan, there is some evidence that the CF is only perceived as a combatant and not as a part of the reconstruction effort. One Afghan national mentioned that Afghans are confused by the duality of Canadian operations in Afghanistan. He said, *“From one side, Canadians, they gave money to CIDA, from the other side, they kill your brother.”*

But, in some instances, military aid is an imperative. As one IO SME said, *“...the actual giving aid, we don’t have an opinion on. Especially if it’s Iraq or somewhere...I mean they have the responsibility to make sure that aid is there...”* However, she was very discouraged when the military adopts *“humanitarian aid as one of their main strategies, and calling it humanitarian aid. We tend to call it military aid to try and differentiate...We get concerned when they start co-opting the language that we’re using or some of the direct strategies like driving around in white land cruisers or not being dressed in military uniforms but civilian clothes. I mean those kinds of things, we will take issue with.”* Another SME from an NGO was troubled by the notion that the military could define what humanitarian agencies are. He said, *“You know I knew there was a change when Colin Powell came out famously and said, ‘All humanitarian agencies are force multipliers for the military.’ You know I read that, and I think every humanitarian read that and was just sort of gob-smacked. We all realized, ‘Okay, this is it. How are we going to be humanitarians when that is the objective?’”*

The preceding examples suggest that maintaining a certain distance or distinctiveness is required to preserve group identity. The principle of neutrality is central to many groups’ capacity to operate and provide aid, and to diminish this principle would threaten their capacity to deliver aid or their accessibility to those in need. However, organizations seem to differ in terms of the distance they

need to have from the CF or military. For example, as one SME from an IO explained, *“it’s not appropriate to say ‘Well, no, we don’t want to [collaborate]...”* However, he continued that he did request that CF personnel wait for NGOs to come to them, rather than vice versa (*“Don’t come to our offices...with your guns...with your armoured cars...we’ll come to yours”*) because the local insurgents would have thought that *“these people are in cahoots with the...occupying force.”* So the principle of neutrality and its impact on collaboration with the CF will vary according to an organization. Nevertheless, the principle should be recognized as central to the identity of non-military, non-governmental partners.

Within the SME discussions, there was evidence of ingroup/outgroup distinctions that may be difficult to overcome. Reflecting on when he served in the CF before becoming a civilian contractor, one NGO SME said, *“I just remember...they drilled into you pretty hard that it was sort of an ‘us and them’ mentality, of the civvies...And I think that’s a pretty hard thing to shake once you sort of drill that into people.”* Another NGO SME said that *“there was a bit of a ‘we’re more humanitarian, they’re soldiers’ sort of division”* in her area of operation. She said that the UN soldiers were perceived as *“tough and gruff...different from NGO workers.”* This perception, she suggested, impacted the degree of interaction that the NGO community chose to have with the UN soldiers in operations. She said, *“I felt like the [UN soldiers] were trying to reach out to the NGO community far more...and they were really good at things like they would host parties and provide food and beverages for everyone and they were always good at inviting the NGO community, but that wasn’t reciprocated... If an NGO had a small gathering at their compound on the weekend, the [UN soldiers] wouldn’t be invited, typically.”* However, she argued that this might have been a reaction to the gender division between the NGO community and the UN soldiers. She continued, *“it could have been just simple male, female stuff. I mean most people who work...[in the military]...are guys and there aren’t that many women there, whereas the NGO community is pretty dominated by females. So I think there was a lot of that going on...a lot of the women working for NGOs felt like [the UN soldiers] were a little bit lust[ful]. But that wasn’t really my experience with them...I think they just like to have a wide circle of people and obviously liked female company.”*

To preserve their professional identity, other organizations, such as the media, also need to be cognizant of the optics in working with other partners. One reporter spoke of the need to keep his distance to ensure his objectivity. He underscored the expectations that come with the profession, and this, he maintained, helped him stay objective and do his job.

“if you’re a journalist, you’re supposed to at least attempt to be objective. You have to be sort of arm’s length. You have to be able to do a balanced job of reporting. It’s not like you can jump up and wave a Canadian flag... You have to report things as facts...You’re there as an observer. So if you’re there as an observer, you can’t actually be a participant. So it’s not like you’re...you know, like you share vehicles with them, you share stories, you know, and smokes and the whole works, but you have to keep a certain arm’s length just to be objective.”

For many non-military organizations working within the public domain, neutrality and impartiality are core values of their professions that cannot be relinquished when working with the CF. In fact, for some NGOs, forfeiting neutrality was a serious threat to how they define themselves and the organization they represent. Maintaining their distinctiveness was critical to their capacity to operate in hostile environments. So though they had no other objections to interacting with the CF, this interaction was restricted as a result of the principle of neutrality. Impartiality, on the other

hand, did not mean that the media could not work with the CF; rather, it referred to “arm’s length” reporting, which simply separates the two professions.

Shared Identity

There was also evidence that sharing an identity promoted collaboration between military and non-military actors in a JIMP operating environment. For example, one SME working for an NGO described as “paramilitary” explained why his organization was able to work well with the CF:

“We come from a paramilitary background... The average member of my team that wears a uniform at work is accustomed to a chain of command and is accustomed to a certain level of conversation and a certain level of respect when...dealing with someone. So it is not uncommon for us to go deal with a Colonel, a Major, a General, or someone and say what we need and state it in a way that is clearly understood. You know, you’re not dealing with a civilian-on-a-civilian, you’re dealing with a paramilitary member to a military member. So there is a certain greater level of understanding... We’re going to have an easier time understanding what the military is going through and their difficulties in moving their cargo and their gear and dealing with the politics than let’s say a civilian agency would, simply because all of our people are accustomed to taking orders, wearing a uniform, and what have you, and we’re not intimidated by that military presence...We are not intimidated by the machine that is ‘the military,’ so I’d say that gives us our edge, and we just want to use their assets, just like we want them to use our assets...”

Others summoned their Canadian identity as a way of establishing common ground and promoting collaboration. For example, “if you weren’t proud to be Canadian before, you are now...and that’s just something that happens. I mean, in Bosnia, being able to go to a military base in Bosnia and get Roots clothing... We sold Roots clothing on base before Tim Horton’s had not started...to just being able to chat about Canada.” Another said, “it helps when you’re the same nationality in a multi-ethnic mission.”

Overall, these findings are consistent with research that shows that individuals are more positively disposed toward outgroup members that they view as more similar than dissimilar (Osbeck, Moghaddam, & Perreault, 1997). This suggests that when working with multiple actors representing diverse organizations in a JIMP operational context, emphasizing similarities and superordinate identities (e.g., Canadian) may be an important strategy.

3.4 Perceptions, Stereotypes, and Prejudice

Perceptions about other organizations and entities within the JIMP environment are likely to have a serious impact on collaboration. Of course, both positive and negative expectations are relevant to the JIMP operational context.

Positive Perceptions

Many non-military SMEs said that they had positive initial perceptions of CF members that were reinforced through collaboration. One IO SME described the CF as “polite,” “friendly,” and “open.” However, he also believed that this perception derives from the positive CF response to his organization. “I think...they also understand the added value to have [his organization] in their office every 2 months or so to discuss things for 1 hour or 2 hours.” Another SME from an NGO described CF members as “very personable,” and believed that “they’re very well trained in terms of people skills, in terms of interacting, in terms of you know a better comprehension that this now modern world is about comprehensive. It’s not always the military solution.” This, he continued,

may be a consequence of incorporating civilians within CF training exercises, providing “*different perspectives.*”

The CF was also described as “*very professional.*” As one Afghan national recalled, “*I was impressed to be honest. I think they were very professional and the contact was very professional and usually you don’t find that in military, I mean in soldiers, you don’t see that... They knew that they were in a different society and a different country...a different culture. So they knew that they needed to learn more so...they...care for that. And to a certain extent, they also wanted to, to reach out and to know more people, to understand their culture. So on that front, I think it was very professional...than many other national member countries’ forces are.*” Moreover, he said that those CF members he worked with were “*really honest and transparent...and to the point,*” which he concluded was a “*good thing*” for collaboration.

One CF SME believed that the local population in Afghanistan thought highly of the CF. He explained that they were “*sad*” to see us go. He said that the Afghans had respect for them: “*We’re getting IEDed [Improvised Explosive Device] to go to the village, you know, it’s a dangerous spot. So yeah ‘Mr. Farmer...you’re in the shit. I’m in the shit. Let’s get the job done for your people’...So there’s that warrior spirit, mutual trust, loyalty, I don’t know what word to use there, but there’s a respect there versus a bureaucrat or an NGO wearing a polo shirt and, you know, Italian shoes driving in their pick-up truck spending an hour or two, and then driving out, right. Or you see ‘the Army guy who lives just down the road, who got rocketed last night, who’s still here this morning, trying to help me with my irrigation issue to flood the field so I can feed my family.*”

He continued that “*when we do a rotation, many of them are sad, most of them cry, like they’re losing a family member, because for them the guy who sit[s] beside them for 6 months...is that.*” This positive perception may be based on close personal interaction between CF members and local Afghans.

However, one NGO participant noted that truly distinguishing between CF and American (or other NATO) forces may actually be a challenge for Afghans who are not intimately working with the CF. He said,

“Most of the people [Afghans] are uneducated. Most of them are illiterate, and so for them, it’s very difficult to distinguish between American forces and Canadian forces...actually 99.9% of the times...local people will refer to Canadians as American forces. They would say ‘the Americans are coming’...so, at the local level, at the household level, at the police level, they cannot distinguish that... At the government level, at the provincial level, the provincial authorities do understand, and I think the interaction is basic—it’s good.”

Another SME from the media mentioned a different perception among locals based on the urban/rural divide. He said,

“In Kandahar, there’s a certain degree of education, literacy and experience...they know the difference between Canadians, Americans, British...When you get outside of Kandahar City, get into the rural areas, it doesn’t matter...the Canadians, the Americans, they don’t see the difference. We’re all foreigners to them...[the] reception that I get in the villages...is different than the reception you get in the city. You are treated with much more suspicion in the rural villages... In the city, there has been...appreciation for what the soldiers have done, appreciation for the money... The further west you go in Kandahar province, the less they like you... you can just see it just by the way that they look at you...whether I’ve been traveling with the troops or whether I’m travelling on my own, you can just see it in their face, you know.”

Moreover, his experience speaking and working with the local population in Afghanistan led him to conclude that the Canadian military contingent is viewed as an occupier. According to him, *“that’s very obvious, okay, yes, you can’t shy away from that.”* But he also believed the CF was not viewed as negatively as other forces. He said that *“They see the Canadians definitely as ‘Yes, they are here. They are here with their big trucks. But they are not as bad as others,’ let’s put it that way.”* In his opinion, the Afghan public perception of the CF is rather neutral (i.e., *“not as bad as others”*). As noted, however, these perceptions may vary somewhat, depending on levels of education, status and geography.

Negative Perceptions

There was some evidence during discussions of negative stereotypes and expectations impacting on collaborative efforts. For example, one participant representing an NGO believed that the CF held negative stereotypes of those in the NGO community. He said that there existed a perception that,

“the civilians are somehow naturally incompetent. And I will agree that there’s a lot of sort wing nut, wonky humanitarians out there...they’re very spacey, I’d say. But I would say that the majority of humanitarian aid workers that I’ve worked with are, in general, pretty switched on. A lot of them have former military backgrounds anyway and a lot of them have operational backgrounds. They come from major corporations in the civilian world... The humanitarian world has become highly professionalized, as well. And I think the military has to work to understand that they can learn a lot from that cadre of humanitarians that really are very professional at what they do. The World Food Program on a yearly basis does far greater military-level support logistics operations than the Canadian Forces has done in the past 20 years. And they do it on a year-to-year basis. So they [the CF] can learn from those operational efficiencies and how they [humanitarians] do it.”

He continued to state that *“I think their attitude a lot of the time is that the civilian world is a bunch of unruly, left-wing, peaceniks...who are going to do everything to scupper their objectives. I think they would be very surprised about the [organization]...that there’s a lot of very professional people, very highly educated, very committed... You know, the [organization] loses close to 240 people a year on average in operations.”* In contrast, he stated that *“there are a lot of NGO workers that you meet that are very hateful of the military and think the military is the worst thing on the planet.”* According to this SME, this had a serious impact on collaborative efforts, because this led NGO workers to do everything in their power to make the CF’s *“life uncomfortable.”*

On the other hand, one CF SME working with NGOs found it difficult because the NGO community uses photo ops in theatre to secure donor money. He said that it was *“kinda weird because their mantra is ‘to help people’ not to help themselves...and it was like ‘You’re here to help the people.’ ‘Oh we’ve got to make sure you know that we...’ ughhh. We’re talking business here, you’ve got starving people and you’re talking business...and that’s what it was, it was a business. It was a dirty business, yeah.”* He continued by stating that *“There are a bunch of stereotypes going around...about NGOs being there just for the money. There are stereotypes about NGO people that they are doing it to make themselves feel good, but not really with the objective of helping...that it is more for their own need...Charity really is sometimes about making yourself feel better.”*

One SME from an NGO attempted to explain why the military and NGOs *“don’t get along.”* He stated that *“NGOs are academics and critics, and they think the CF is dumb...They think they are dealing with a bunch of jock idiots that, you know, only know how to fire a weapon...The CF*

leadership doesn't necessarily respect the, you know, hippy left wing academic from the NGO world...So, they butt heads, right... They [the CF] don't get along with typical NGOs."

It was also clear from discussions that negative perceptions of other groups and entities in the JIMP environment may be inevitable given the range of different goals and interests in play. One CF SME spoke of his work with the UN in the Middle East and said that given the number of "uniformed" personnel and the number of different motives for participating, it was likely that the civilian contingency would not have a "favourable impression of the uniform pieces." The key in this situation, then, is knowing which representatives of the military system are actually influencing the stereotypes and expectations that emerge. Are attitudes toward the military being influenced by the "new-age" soldier who understands the complexities of the JIMP environment or by the personnel who espouse an independent "warrior" ethic that defies true collaboration?

Stereotype Reduction

Research suggests that one way to reduce stereotypes or negative perceptions of other groups is by bringing them together (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007), so that group members can learn about and reappraise one another (Pettigrew, 1998). As Pettigrew holds, contact has the potential to lower anxiety about interacting with an outgroup and may help to promote affective ties. SME responses showed that contact with outgroup members can mitigate initial negative stereotypes. For example, one NGO SME implied that even though she previously had somewhat negative stereotypes about military personnel, as she worked with them, she increasingly saw military personnel "as people," rather than as representatives of the military system. In her words,

"When I started socializing with them more...I got to know them as people, but also saw more about what their jobs were, what they work with, what they did...I realized that they were...putting their lives on the line a lot to make sure that places were safe for us to go into. So they would go on these 4-day missions to, you know, village X, because an NGO...had plans to open up an office there and they would do this assessment and see if it was safe or not. So I guess I kind of felt like these are the guys who are doing the dirty work for us basically...making sure places were safe...When they told stories about being in these horrible places...that's what really drove it home for me."

Other participants from NGOs implied that using contact to learn more about the goals and priorities of NGO personnel also helped to reduce the stereotypes of CF personnel. As one NGO SME said, "[take] the time and the energy to get to know what their [NGOs'] real objectives are. Why are they there? Why do they care about this issue?" Another NGO participant said that "nothing like a cup of coffee or a beer to solve those problems [stereotypes]." In this sense, more personal knowledge about what matters to other individuals may be one way to change negative perceptions.

One CF SME noted another strategy employed to counter negative stereotypes of the CF. He argued for the importance of transparency in informing others about one's intentions, and of staying within the appropriate "lane." He mentioned that efforts have been made within the CIMIC community to break down the stereotype that army guys are just out to gather intelligence. He explained that,

"CIMIC has branded itself...So if you represent yourself as a CIMIC guy and you don't ask those int-type questions, those who are in the business, international humanitarian NGO business, they know what question you're supposed to ask, and the second you go outside

that...lane, you're done. So as an army guy, make sure you don't ask those 'not to ask' questions... You can't just put an army guy doing...this function."

He also implied that the personnel who will be successful working within the public sphere of JIMP have a particular set of characteristics or profile. As will be shown in a later section, SMEs identified a number of particular individual traits or characteristics that may promote effective collaboration in a JIMP operational context.

Another strategy that could be used to break down negative stereotypes of the CF involves offering NGOs "*tangible things*" that clarify expectations and deliverables. As one SME from an NGO suggested, a handbook detailing what the CF can give ("*we can move your stuff, we can provide you first rate protection, we can give you intelligence on what's happening on that road*") may be helpful. Without knowledge of what the CF can "bring to the table," he said, potential partners may fail to adequately understand each other, and this could further entrench negative stereotypes of one another.

This suggests that one way to prevent negative expectations (based on misunderstandings or core lack of knowledge) is to provide clear and unequivocal information about positive skills and intentions.

3.5 Trust

Trust is commonly argued to be a positive contributor to collaborative efforts. There were many examples of interactions suggesting a high degree of trust in theatre among individuals representing diverse organizations. SMEs, both military and civilian, provided examples about how trust can be built within a JIMP operational context. These included demonstrations of competence, sharing risky experiences "*outside the wire*," maintaining professional integrity, and invoking and adhering to a strong institutional framework (e.g., established practices, etc.). The sections that follow explore these positive examples of building trust, as well as some of the violations of trust described by SMEs.

Building Trust

SMEs provided a number of examples pertaining to the emergence of trust in operations. As an embedded reporter, one media SME relayed how he works to build trust with the CF by demonstrating competence and understanding of the CF's world. As he said,

"If you demonstrate a certain degree of knowledge about what you're doing, their [CF] world, it makes a whole heck of lot difference... If you can speak their [CF] language... You know what I mean, like you know the things that are...[of]...concern to them, then you know they have a tendency to be like 'Oh. Okay, you know.'"

He recalled a time in Afghanistan when he was driving with the battalion commander and they spoke at length about the current vehicle armour in comparison to that which he had observed when he was embedded with the CF in Bosnia. He also explained how he takes the time to get to know the particular units with which he will be interacting in operations, and this helps him to build rapport and trust with military personnel. He explained,

"When I first started going to Kandahar and first started covering the army, very intently, I would always make sure that I would read thoroughly the regiment history, the history of the unit that I'm covering. And where they'd been, what they'd done you know sort of

idea...and that very quickly helped me build bridges with members...of the forces. Because if, if you know what you're talking about...they're gonna respect that."

Another SME representing an NGO also mentioned that trust is earned by demonstrating competence. He explained how he negotiated with the military during the evacuation from the US Embassy in Liberia in 1996 by sharing information about and demonstrating one's organizational capacity (e.g., systems) and resources in a crisis situation. He recalled his experience:

"We were doing the manifesting but then they [military] added a couple guys on so they could actually...learn our system of manifesting and so they could take it over when we went. When I saw that I thought, wow, they could have just thrown everything we'd done out, but they didn't do that. And then they took a look at what we were doing...all of these people coming in and people with kids, and they saw us as a softer side of meeting these people. So we had, you know, one of our pilots is a woman. She was...she frisked the ladies that came in and then somebody would say, like me, I might say 'My name is...I'm here to, you know, come on over with me. This soldier here, he's here to help you and he'll take you over to where you can wait for your helicopter.' And people relaxed...and it worked really well...This was an example of an NGO using all of the resources that we had...and the military with the resources that they had, and there was this hard-side/soft-side interface that worked really, really well...In the end, you know, at least 1,000 people went through that combination and probably had the most...positive experience that you could have, if you'd lost everything and had to be evacuated out of the country in the middle of the night."

The outcome of this experience, he continued, was his lasting respect and regard for military personnel in general.

SMEs from the public domain also commented on the competency of CF members. For example, one SME from the media said *"the new breed is a new ball of wax. And they're all pretty universally sharp. I haven't run into a dumb one yet."* This belief in the competence of CF personnel is clearly relevant to trust in them. However, one NGO SME suggested that these perceptions about the ability of CF personnel need to be reinforced to build trust with the NGO community. He argued that the general perception of the military was two dimensional (i.e., *"fighters and shooters"*). He suggested emphasizing the existing level of diversity of education within the forces (e.g., engineers, doctors, etc.) as a way of making clear that previous stereotypes about what military personnel are like might be outdated. So, once again, interacting with competent partners was a way in which individuals from diverse organizations established trust with their collaboration counterparts.

Another way that trust among JIMP counterparts emerged in the field was through common experiences *"outside the wire...with the troops."* Being outside the wire is clearly a higher risk activity, and this shared experience of risk worked to heighten camaraderie. One SME from the media argued that sharing experiences and telling the stories from the field are *"sort of a base for, if not friendship, at least mutual respect."* As a non-military personnel, this SME believed that he got *"more respect,"* because he was willing to *"eat what they eat"* and speak their language (i.e., *"gallows humour"* – *"being a smart ass and sarcastic"*) outside the safety of the compound. As a result, he believed that the soldiers respected him and were more honest with him. He stated that *"they [the troops] are much more relaxed and more willing to talk to someone who is out sharing the same sort of risks...The soldiers actually are really grateful...because a lot of them don't believe that the story of what they're doing, back home, is really being told."* This same sentiment was reflected by another SME from the media. He stated that *"soldiers have a tendency to accept*

you more if you are willing to share their burdens and their risks with them. And if you have walked the same ground as them, and you've done it without complaining or you've done it without passing out or whatever, they have the tendency to be much more open and much more respectful."

Demonstrating professional integrity is another way to build trust. For example, an SME reporter said that he gained the troops' trust because they simply read his articles and could determine the kind of reporter he was as a result. This process, he explained, was transparent:

"People have computers, and people Google and they check you out. The military knows what kind of reporter you are. If you're someone who's out there to screw people over or try to sensationalize, then you'll find that your opportunities are a little bit more limited than somebody who is just simply telling the truth..."

He provided an anecdote that underscored the troops' ability to uncover a reporter's motivation. He began,

"Generally, you know, they're [the troops] pretty sharp guys. It doesn't take them long to get a measure of who they're talking to...I mean, we did a tour of Sarposa Prison...and this Italian journalist wanted to come along. As we're getting this wonderful tour of the prison, and I was kind of annoyed that the guy was invited along anyway, he's asking the head Canadian guy...to see the interrogation rooms. The guy looked at him and started laughing. He says, 'This is a prison. There are no interrogation rooms here.' Like, he [Italian journalist] figured that he took them in there and beat them [the prisoners] with rubber hoses. I mean, he should have been trying for this national directorate of security if he was looking for something on that...desperate for something sensational! The guy turned to me, and he says, 'Who is this asshole?' and he says, 'He's not getting another comment out of me.' Because they are smart enough that...they know when someone's trying to blow things out of proportion."

Maintaining one's professional integrity was vital to building trust, and in the opinion of the SME quoted above, led to more open communication and general buy-in of his efforts from the soldiers on the ground.

One SME from the NGO community mentioned that the CF staff officers with whom she worked were honest with information regarding security in operations. She said *"I felt people were very frank about it, you know, that they were honest and 'We can't share this' or you know 'That's not a question I can answer and here's why,' and various sort of transparency I felt."* This willingness to be transparent increased her trust level in the military.

With respect to detainees and detention issues, one SME from an IO said that he could *"absolutely"* count on the CF to provide him with the necessary information about what they [the CF] could and could not do. Moreover, he believed that the CF members he dealt with were honest, but he clarified what he meant by honesty within this context (i.e., a war zone). He explained that,

"Honesty is a very strong word...all of the questions that we raise, all the issues that we discuss...they tell me very clearly 'You know sir, in regards to this engagement we have had in that particular district, this is what has happened and I cannot tell you more because it is classified.' Again also here they tell you, 'I can tell you this. I can't go any further.' So in that sense, yes, they are honest with us. They tell us very clearly 'It's the limit and I can't go any further.' I liked it."

However, when considering rules of engagement, ambiguity can also destabilize trust. The same SME indicated that it is his NGO's role to investigate potentially illegitimate military engagements.

On these issues, he explained, the CF will argue that they engaged military targets, whereas the civilians will argue that the CF engaged illegitimate targets (e.g., farmers). In these instances, he explains, *“things are not conclusive...”* Trusting the source becomes more problematic, but he adds it does not damage the relationship. In his own words,

“Sometimes you have to agree to disagree. And I think the relationship that we have established...we can agree to disagree. But the relationship continues...It is professional from their side. It is professional from our side... They take time to explain themselves...something that I appreciate very much of them...”

He continued that in all his operational experience he had never come across *“a one-star General discussing/debating an issue for 45 minutes...real[ly] engaging...[and]...follow[ing]-up.”* This he argued was unprecedented and he congratulated his CF counterpart for it.

Considering the variety of different NGOs and IOs in operations, some may be more respected by the CF as a result of the level of professionalism. Clear mandates and objectives and previous operational experience can help to develop an organization’s reputation and may help produce more interorganization trust. Further, as the NGO SME quoted above concluded, *“we are predictable...I think that has helped a great deal...So if you are predictable enough, they [CF] know what we can do, they know our limits.”* This predictability, then, seemed to have fostered respect and trust.

Another SME from an NGO said that he thought that the CF was predictable because they are a task- and deliverable-oriented culture, which was similar to his organization. He said, *“the difference between them [the CF] and let’s say other agencies is you know they will get their work done... Respect is just afforded in the fact that you understand these are task-oriented people...that will deliver a product...or...a result.”* Trust in this case emerges from a belief in the organizational culture and the associated, and predictable, work ethic.

Finally, one local Afghan who had previous working experience with the CF in operations thought that trust can be facilitated through reliable institutional frameworks. To avoid eroding the loyalty of the Afghan people working for the CF (e.g., as translators), he suggested having *“...good human resource management...You have to make sure that the staff that you have...that work for you are happy and satisfied with their jobs, if they need assistance, if they needed accommodation...make sure...those needs are met...usually the folks at the Kandahar PRT are...more against Taliban...than the Canadians are... When they are willing to put their lives at risk for your mission, I think you have to have better human resources policies...at least treat them as your employees not as contractors or something else.”* From his perspective, ensuring good management of the Afghan people working for the CF is critical to maintaining a positive and trusting relationship with them.

Trust Violations

Although there was ample evidence of positive trust relationships, SMEs also provided some instances when trust was violated within the public domain. For example, despite working for Canadian agencies at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), Afghan nationals explained how they were treated with suspicion by the CF. Military procedures that emphasize security can also erect barriers to collaborating with local populations, and these barriers have the potential to damage the growth of trusting relationships. For example, one Afghan was very candid about describing his experience of the CF. He stated that,

"I like military. But the way they operate, I don't like. And their system, I don't like... When I was coming to work they have...two, three doors inside. When you go to PRT...firstly we have to be searched by Afghan police. It's okay. In the second door, you have to be searched by Canadians. And the third door, you still have to be searched by Canadians... The way they, they search you is, sometimes, it's really offending to people and they should not touch, you know, the parts of your body that are not supposed to be touched. You know, and many people, they get offended...I know it's a part of your job, you do this. But other people...other Afghans that they want to come for meetings, like directors of a new department, they really get offended... They were not willing to come to PRT for the meetings because they hated this searching...I understand they have, they are bounded with restrictions and rules and all these things. And they have to do their job. But sometimes it was, it was, it was really... I would say that very, you know bad for...our Afghan people. They were not happy from the actions the Canadian troops they are doing, you know. Like, you enter somebody's home, and you break the door and you go there. People...they get offended by such actions."

He provided another example of where he was treated with suspicion.

"When I was working for the Canadian military...I was reporting...incident...to my...Colonel, and the Colonel was writing the same report on the computer... When I wanted to see that report, he was saying that 'No. This is confidential.' Like... 'I'm telling you my report and then you write it on your computer, and then you report this, you are saying this is confidential, what... I don't want to see your data or anything. I want to see my report, what you are reporting. Are you adding something or are you removing something from my report?' Do you know what I am saying? It makes me sometimes think that...they are so stupid sometimes. Not all of them. I mean some of them. But I've experienced this. The majority of them are like this."

He also provided another instance where he felt like he was being investigated rather than supported when reporting to the CF. He explained that while working at the KPRT, he had to take grid references in Afghanistan for the CF, which was a huge risk to himself and, by extension, his family. He did not believe that the CF could fully appreciate the risks and costs associated with this role. He recalled his challenges:

"It was a very tough job, you know, to go to a place which is fully insecure, and you have to be...you have to have beard. You have to have like turban to enter into that environment, you know, to go to that area... How crazy I was that I had GPS [Global Positioning System] in my hand. I had camera. I had like, pen and paper, which...if somebody looks at your notebook, that person would clearly know...where you are coming from...we were not mentioning this to our [organization] colleagues or the managers how hard it is for us to go to a place, a place where... a site that was attacked one or two days ago, and you go there you take pictures, it, it is very, very hard. But I'm sure some of the military, some of our CF folks they, they knew the level of the risk in those areas and how hard this is. Yeah, sometimes it makes me feel that maybe the effort or the work that you are doing is not appreciated, but no...it was not something that they forced me to do, it was my decision to go...I know it is risk, but it is also helping the Canadians and also the Canadian mission in Kandahar. So why not...go? If you just get that reference of the bridge and maybe Canadians they can deploy their troops in that area and the construction...will progress and then we will have our bridge which will connect Dand District with other neighbouring districts..."

“You’re in tension about your family and how they would be doing, even they were, they were...I was one and a half, two kilometres far from work to my home, but when going to work I was feeling, that...there is no guarantee to...life...guarantee that you would safely return to your home from work or not. It’s like, so, I was in tension everywhere and when you go to work you have to watch who is following you, who is behind you...they [insurgents] do follow such individuals that work inside the KPRT or work in any base... It doesn’t matter even if you are a cook, even if you are a cleaner they, they don’t care they, they...you will be punished for doing that... On the way you need to take some steps, you know, to mitigate the risks, you know, precautions that you have to take. You have to change your timing, you have to change your appearance, you have to be very low profile, you have to have, you know, cars...like you need to change your means of transportation, routes, all these things...I couldn’t eat there, like when you’re sad, you’re angry, you can’t even eat, you can’t drink water. It was like that...”

“There were no course of...actions were taken to, you know, to provide that security or support. We requested the authorities that, at the KPRT, that I was followed and what are the precautions that I need to take. But...they have the intelligence department. They have FSG [Fire Support Group] offices or units. Basically they just write...what time, when it happened, who was that, how the people were looking, you know, why you were taking this road, why not this road, and what car you were...tends to be, you know, just investigating you...When you asked me these questions, it means you will provide support maybe, if not support you would actually guide me what to do, what not to do. If it is you or the intelligence department in return told me that, ‘Well basically we don’t provide securities, but we need to put this in our record.’ ‘What? You just need to put this in your record and, and that’s all? Well I thought you’d at least, if you would guide me what precautions I need to take.’”

This failure of the CF personnel with whom he was working to clearly acknowledge and show appreciation for the dangers that this person had undertaken seems to have been experienced as a violation of the implicit trust and mutual respect required for optimal long-term collaborative partnerships.

Speaking of the CF response to the attack on Sarposha Prison, one Afghan national argued that the CF’s image was tarnished in the eyes of the Afghans living in Kandahar City. He explained,

“The prison was attacked and now the Canadian Forces were the combat submission group. They were standing one kilometre away from, from that prison, they, they were not willing to go to that prison because the enemy were still there fighting the security guards in the prison. But they were not going to go there with the Afghan police. Once everybody got out, the area was cleared, then they went, you know... It really effects negatively on the mindset of people... ‘Okay you, you wanted to, like you were here to save my country, to protect me, so this is now the time just go there, attack there, fight with them. Why are you standing one kilometre away from the prison, because...???’ In reply they were saying, ‘You know, the area was not clear.’ Come on! The area was not clear? You have armoured vehicles. You have the technology, everything. You could fight them. Just go, go, get close – fight! You could kill them. You could, you know, prevent the prisoners, the criminals to go out of jail. Not only the political prisoners...escaped actually. But also, also lots of criminals, they also escaped from that prison...How can you expect to have a good peace and situation in Kandahar? Everywhere killings. These people...they would kill...people for only ten dollars or maybe fifty dollars.”

Afghan SMEs also reported poor treatment of some of their compatriots who worked at the KPRT. One such SME explained that in their capacity as interpreters Afghans were often seen simply as “interpreters.” He complained that “often they would refer to me as interpreter, which was not my role. So that, they need to improve.” He continued that interpreters did not always receive the respect they deserved and as a consequence, “They were unsatisfied with their work... They put their lives equally at risk...actually more at risk...than the Canadian soldiers... They would not be treated with the respect they wanted... They end up treating the interpreters as soldiers, which is not the case. They are not used to that kind of command. They are not used to that kind of work. And they are physically not that strong, so you have to consider those areas...” He provided an example of an interpreter whose interests were overlooked:

“There was an incident...there was this interpreter, one of the best interpreters at the Kandahar PRT and so he, he went out...into Kandahar city and they [CF patrol] were attacked and they were hit by an IED and so there were...casualties... So what they did...was they sent...the people back to the PRT and...they asked this interpreter who was also injured, he had a serious...injury, to stay at the...place of the incident and interpret for the other soldiers. He [Afghan national] said that, he was complaining to me, and he said that [he had a serious injury] and he needed to stay there to interpret to make sure that everything was finished and then to come back with other...So you know such examples hurt these people, and those people are the most important people you can trust in such a city. I mean betray...and accuse them, it’s incentive to change parties...”

Again, this core failure to properly prioritize the health and well-being of the Afghan interpreter was seen by this SME as a poor way to treat people who are taking a serious risk in working for and with the CF. This example could be argued to be a failure of collaboration, in the sense that true collaboration requires consideration of the needs and interests of both parties. The needs of the interpreter in this example seemed to have been sublimated to the needs of the CF.

Another Afghan recalled the example of a bomb dropping on a wedding party in Kandahar. He commented,

“You might have heard that in Afghanistan...no matter if it’s Canadian or American, they drop bomb on a wedding party and they kill bride and groom. Like, that is the happiest day of their life. And you kill them on that day. Now, if this happened to me, or whoever killed my brother on his wedding day, of course I will have this in my mind and if I, if I am in power, on the outs, I would take revenge... The Afghans who were hurt by Canadians or who were injured by Canadians, whose relatives and families were killed in such actions...they wouldn’t even like to talk about Canadians or Americans or NATO. I know. I have seen people that I have talked to. They don’t even want to discuss such things. They say, ‘Don’t talk to me about them. If I am in power, I blow myself up, even though I am an educated guy, but they killed my family’... The way they [the CF] operate, it’s not good. They [Afghans] don’t like it... There are maybe other alternatives, other ways to operate.”

These accounts of CF trust violations seem likely to have made a lasting negative impression on the local population. Specifically, SMEs implied that trust violations can decrease overall local support for the CF, such that it is “incentive to change parties” (i.e., support the Taliban and insurgents, rather than the CF or other members of the International Security Assistance Force). As winning the hearts and minds of the local population is critical for CF operational success, it is imperative to ensure that trust is developed and maintained with the local population.

Other SMEs, working in the NGO community, questioned CF intentions for participating in humanitarian relief efforts. As one such SME said, the military are there to “*further their own agenda...take pictures...find out what the lay of the land is... ‘Yeah, we’re going to bring in our landing craft with food this time, but next time...if the Islamic forces get too dangerous...we will have gained a lot of military intelligence to be able to come in here next time’ ...So the military are just as bad as the religious-based NGOs...they’re not here for the people.*” In this case, the CF was charged with having ulterior motives for providing humanitarian aid.

Clarity and transparency about the goals of CF operations will be vital to building trust with the public domain in a JIMP operational context. In fact, one SME from an NGO suggested that the CF image and reputation is so tenuous that one negative story of unethical military conduct (e.g., in Somalia, Guantanamo, etc.) will violate the NGO community’s trust in them irrespective of the “*10 great things that the military does.*” It is necessary, therefore, that the CF secures its reputation in the eyes of the public, and perhaps that it works proactively to counter the inevitable negative incidents that will occur.

The onus, of course, is not entirely on the CF to establish and maintain trust. A few CF SMEs voiced their lack of trust with the civilian agencies in operations. One described NGOs as both dishonest and incompetent, following his experience on a humanitarian relief effort. He recalled,

“They weren’t necessarily telling the truth of what was going on on the ground. They were looking at how to improve their infrastructure or their image to their donor agencies... They were requesting stuff to stock pile their inventory, because they knew the gravy train from New York or wherever, the donors...were willing to fork anything...to say that they’re supporting the efforts of the disaster. So a lot of it was a bit of the political ‘How can we increase our inventory of our assets?’ ...That was my perception.”

He also questioned the NGOs’ ability to prepare its staff to work in humanitarian emergency efforts. He said, “*As the organization, on the individual preparation to deal with emergency or disaster, they were not trained or prepared to deal in those situations. The training program does not exist necessarily in those agencies.*”

Another CF member said that there was very little trust working with [IO], which required him to take care of his own needs and to continuously “*verify.*” This lack of trust required deliberate efforts to defensively monitor other parties to ensure that they were fulfilling their commitments. As he explained, one work-around was to order more supplies than was necessary in the short-term: “*If we needed five cans of something, we ordered eight. Or if we knew we wouldn’t need stuff until next month, we would order it this month just to make sure.*” He argued that his civilian counterparts were “*completely disorganized and very focused on themselves.*” Moreover, he argued that [IO] is “*not responsive or flexible or particularly agile and it’s very bureaucratic and it’s very driven on position of hierarchy more so than the military without that operational imperative which in the military can at least drive things through the bureaucratic system.*” The [IO] administration, he concluded, supported the civilian side over the uniform side.

As outlined in the framework for CF collaboration in a JIMP operational environment, we argue that shared trust is a condition for effective collaboration. Moreover, we also identified trust as a core theme in previous work with SMEs who had operated in a JIMP context (Thomson et al., 2010). For the current project, SMEs who represent the public element in CF operations also discussed the importance of trust for collaborative activities. In some cases, SMEs spoke of existing trust, whereas in other cases, SMEs spoke of a lack of trust. Indeed, some Afghan

nationals did not feel like they were trusted by the CF, despite having worked for them. On the other hand, some CF SMEs expressed a lack of trust in working with some IOs and NGOs.

3.6 External Factors

There was some evidence that external or contextual factors, primarily the type of mission (e.g., humanitarian, peacekeeping, warfighting, etc.), will determine not only the level of collaboration but also its effectiveness. Considering humanitarian aid, one SME from an IO said, *“I think like in earthquakes in countries that are stable, there’s a huge role for militaries to play and then have a much better capacity than we do to play it. So I think that as an organization, one of our challenges is being smart enough to see the difference and to make sure that we’re negotiating in a way that fits with the environment.”* Comparing CF participation in Afghanistan to the Congo or Sudan, one SME working for an NGO said that the CF adopts *“a much more...collaborative approach”* in the latter. She suggested that the lack of collaboration in an operation such as Afghanistan is the result of *“the security”* issue in a non-permissive or hostile environment (i.e., greater risks to those who associate with the CF). She continued, *“I mean that’s the whole big argument with the civil-military collaboration in Afghanistan in general.”* For organizations that are required to ensure neutrality in conflict zones (such as Afghanistan), thus, the ability to collaborate with the CF will be diminished.

Another SME from the NGO community described the situation operating in Darfur. She mentioned how NGO activities could be shut down if NGO workers were seen collaborating with the UN military. She stated, *“some heads of offices for NGOs didn’t like their staff interacting with [the UN military],”* because, in Darfur, *“NGOs get kicked out a lot and NGO workers themselves are targeted...and the [UN] is not liked by the Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner who basically decides who stays and who goes.”* Within this context, keeping a low profile was deemed necessary for mission success. As such, there is an *“immense pressure...on NGO workers to be culturally appropriate, to behave appropriately, to not draw attention to themselves, and to not get expelled from Darfur and have their project stopped by the government.”*

These examples suggest that the type of operation and role that the CF plays in it will influence collaboration. In some cases, it will determine both the form and extent of collaboration among varying partners. But it will also shape the experiences one has working in a civil-military context. As one NGO SME reflected, his *“experiences with them in Africa...was generally exceptionally positive,”* whereas this was not the case in his recollections from Cyprus and Afghanistan.

3.7 Organizational Training

Discussions also included the issue of how organizational training and education might contribute to improving collaboration within the JIMP domain. SMEs provided advice regarding how the civil-military relationship could be furthered through organizational training. Specifically, they identified a number of individual competencies that they believed were necessary for individuals who would be collaborating with actors representing diverse organizations. They also highlighted the knowledge that should be conveyed through the training system in order to further understanding about the various actors in theatre. Finally, they provided suggestions for training this capacity.

Individual Competencies

SMEs identified a number of particular characteristics that they argue are critical for collaborating in a JIMP operational environment, including:

- openness;
- flexibility;
- empathy (i.e., understanding different points of view);
- being practical;
- good judgement;
- being a good listener;
- diplomacy;
- being strong willed;
- being patient;
- being perseverant;
- good health;
- being social; and
- possessing a sense of humour.

Some SMEs mentioned that individuals operating in a JIMP context, collaborating with others from diverse operations, needed to be able to hold their own in negotiations, especially when NGOs had to work within the military system. As one NGO SME put it, *“you have to be able to stand your ground and defend your position,”* without, of course, being intimidated or inflexible. One CF SME suggested that an individual should be a high self-monitor (i.e., someone who can readily change their behaviour to fit the situation; Snyder, 1974; as cited in De Dreu, 2004) in order to *“adapt his [or her] behaviour to mirror the other individual.”* Moreover, one SME from an IO said that to be able to collaborate well, *“you need to be able to empathize...put yourself in the other person’s skin...asking people to sit down and formulate how the other person would respond...try to get somebody who can think on their feet and kind of relate you know.”*

Speaking of members of the CF who she has met in CF exercises, one NGO SME explained that the retired Generals are *“superb.”* She stated: *“These guys are amazing because they realize the benefit of understanding the actors around them. But not with this sort of secretive ‘We want to understand you and then go back and analyze in our little cave,’ but ‘We want to actually diplomatically communicate with you.’”* One CF SME said that the *“best compliment is when they try to recruit you [from the army] after your tour to join them right? So that’s kinda the type of personality you need in an army guy in this [CIMIC] function.”* In conclusion, it was mentioned that *“army guys need to be more educated, trained into the civilian world...to get some little stories and connections...to break the ice with the NGOs, the UN agencies.”*

Knowledge of Collaboration Counterparts

According to SMEs, there was a general lack of knowledge regarding the contemporary operating theatre and, more significantly, the multiple players involved. As one NGO SME stated, *“I remember talking to one of the majors on the ground there and I said, ‘You do realize what’s happening with the modern sort of world that we live in? Every battle you fight from now on, you are going to be integrated with civilian NGOs and you’re going to be integrated with civilian support personnel and civilian contractors. And you’re going to have to get your head around that... Some of the guys got it. Some of the guys really saw the future of this. And some of the guys were just totally like, ‘Look, you’re civilian, stay out of our way.’”* However, he said, *“there are very few places in the world where we are seeing humanitarian emergencies that are not linked also with political issues, military issues, strategic, security issues.”*

A misunderstanding of the contemporary operating space is further compounded by the fact that the NGO world is virtually unknown to the military, according to some NGO SMEs. As one such

SME said, *“I think there is also this fear of the unknown... We need to manipulate the unknown so that it is known enough that it doesn't hurt us. And I think that is the problem. With the NGOs, they [the military] are worried that we are too much of the unknown.”* Eliminating the unknown seems necessary in order to advance collaboration efforts between the CF and NGOs.

At the same time, it was suggested that the NGO world needs to better understand the military domain. Having worked in the CF training system, one SME from an NGO suggested that the NGO community should learn about complex environments and be able to distinguish between COIN and peace-enforcing. She also thought that the NGO community needed to understand chapter six and chapter seven UN missions. She advocated integrated training experiences, stating that the *“more exposure, you know, the more civilians you can get to jointly train with them [CF] or act as instructors or all those things are really important.”* One CF participant thought that *“more investment in training with NGOs, more commitment from the governmental partners,”* would lead to *“a more multilateral approach,”* which he believed would build civil-military relations.

One NGO SME suggested that negotiating resources could work, if NGOs knew what the CF could offer them in various operations (i.e., humanitarian) and what the CF's role is. He believed that the CF needed to make their services better known. He explained,

“I think if the military just affords itself as a service provider, kind of like ‘Here's our job. Here's what we're here to do. But here are the services we can provide to other groups.’ And just make those services known then the other groups can make the decision... ‘Do we want to access that?’... It is just a matter of negotiating service at that point. You know, like, ‘Is it something that we need? Is it something we can use?’”

This knowledge, he continued, is not known to other NGOs. He stated that,

“We happen to know that we can get our stuff moved by any military because we have done it,” [but in general] *“it's completely unclear... There's no handbook that says ‘This is how you go’... There is no rules that say ‘If you come in and fill this piece of paper out, take it to the logistics guy, and this is how you're going to move your gear.’... There is no clear statement on what services they have to offer, right. There is no clear rule of engagement for them, you know like, how do you get them involved.”*

Moreover, he thought that the CF role in any given operation was not transparent, rather *“a little nebulous.”* He recalled his experience in Haiti. For example,

“They are in for the disaster. But what specifically are they in for? ‘Yes, I know your hospital is going up. But who are you treating?’... ‘Are you a primary care hospital? Are you a post-surgery hospital for amputees? What are you?’... ‘How long are you staying? How long will that hospital be there? Is it a facility that I can bring complicated cases to?’... There were CF personnel that were doing rescue capacity early on... We had no idea who they were, where they were, where they were assigned, how it was coordinated.”

He explained that there was no dissemination of information from the CF regarding their objectives. On the other hand, he said,

“The Israelis said: ‘This is the category of patient we want. Do you have these critical levels of patients? Look at our critical facility here.’ Right? ‘We will come get them’... They will lay out right to you what they want... This comes down to deployment and experience... That Israeli commander has put that hospital out more times than, I guarantee you, the CF has... they are quite proficient.”

For starters, the NGO SME suggested a formal process that would make transparent what the CF's role in any given operation is. This might make the CF more accessible to other agencies (i.e., NGOs), which may increase the desire to collaborate with the military. For example, according to this same SME, *"if the Canadian Forces had a little website...or a login section, Canadian Forces on Deployment...This is our operations. Here's where we are. Here's our phone numbers. Here's our logistic movement sheets. '...If they had everything set up for you, then you could just get all that information in. Think of the amount of time you could save, because then you could have all that information in and then still go and do that relationship side. But then you've handed over all the info and then they know what's coming. So, you can do things...to set it up...If they have a formal process now, it is not widely known."* Greater knowledge of the diverse players in theatre, their resources and capacity seems vital and would likely facilitate more effective collaboration.

Other NGO SMEs emphasized the need to increase interaction with the CF through education and training. As one such SME declared, *"we're always open to do speeches...to...share this [NGO] way of thinking. Just to get the debate going...I don't think we're gonna get agreement about it [comprehensive approach] but we have to somehow find a way of co-existing in the same environment... We're ready to step up and...have discussions...and do trainings and stuff like that. In terms of getting training, yeah it's interesting because I don't think that we've thought that far ahead."* She said that her organization convened a "round table" with a number of military personnel from the CF and the US, which seemed to increase greater understanding of other groups, but which also raised doubts about whether organizations (whether CF or NGO) would be willing to change in order to collaborate. She said,

"At the end of 2009... We invited people from Canadian Forces...and from the US forces...and then got people from our operations in from Europe and we had a 2-day meeting... We just put on the table who we are and what we're about and...a number of the gentleman who joined us, they did the same and it was a really good discussion because I think for [organization] some of the office people really saw what they were up against in terms of...thinking that maybe they could change the policies of these military groups... What I walked away with was... 'Okay, we're not changing anything. We've got to find our way of agreeing to disagree.' And I think a number of people from the CF and the US forces also sort of walked away saying, 'Okay, these guys aren't changing. We've got to find a way of dealing with them when we're in the field.'"

This exposure was important because it essentially identified the limitations her organization has for collaborating in the field with the CF.

Still, those civilian organizations who have participated in CF work-up training prior to rotations, sharing their organization's history, mandate, specific operational objectives, and staff, have reaped the benefits. As one IO SME described,

"The last 2 years we have been able to make a presentation to the task force as they are in their work-up trainings...rather than doing...the sort of PR [Public Relations] 45-min/1-hour presentation in Petawawa, this is more of meeting in their headquarters as it were, and coming in and acting as the [IO] representative in the field. So speaking to the task force commander very much lined up in his scenario, which is playing a real scenario coming in and representing what we are trying to do from our side based in Kandahar. So representing our interests there. So meeting with him and his key staff and then meetings with other people including legal side...explaining who we are and who we are not because there is a complete misconception across the board, in fact, pretty much worldwide... So there's a lack of understanding... We do have a specific role in armed

conflict... There is always this interest in knowing there is an independent organization that are actually living in the centre of the town, which has got 30 international staff and we have no security, operating without military escorts, that we are talking to people, and we are talking to all parties [of the conflict]...My goal is clearly to make the link, so that there is this awareness and to set the ground for a subsequent meeting in the field..."

Consequently, the CF, as this SME continued, “*know very well what [organization] is all about. They are extremely well briefed before they come here. And I have had a very...I mean it's really....it's a high respect from their side for [our organization].*” Comprehension of the role and responsibilities of various organizations developed in CF training helps promote respect and good relations in operations, conditions necessary for effective collaboration.

One concern that was raised was knowledge retention. In other words, what would happen to all of the knowledge gained from Afghanistan and how would it be incorporated into future CF education and training? As one IO SME said “*I think that the danger we see is lessons learned disappearing as you [the CF] pull out. And the danger of repeating things 5 or 10 years down the line. That is the biggest concern.*” Thus, SMEs advocated for dissemination of the knowledge gained from recent deployments as well as an effort to understand the multiple actors in the JIMP operational context.

Effective Integrated Training and Education

Some SMEs, both military and non-military, made suggestions with respect to CF pre-deployment training and the ways to incorporate non-military actors effectively. For example, there was doubt with respect to the effectiveness of mere lectures, given the hands-on approach in the military. For example, one SME from an IO said integrated training needs to be focused directly on “*future operations*” and the relevance of each particular player. As he continued,

“you can talk in an education environment until you are blue in the face. But frankly, if people have a preconception that you are (a) a tree hugger or (b) humanitarian, that if you have no relevance, then they are not going to talk to you. When people are focusing on where they are going and you are talking about a team that is in the area, then perhaps there's a bit more interest. But again not many of them [CF personnel] will come across the team because they're not exactly very high-profile down there. There is that other aspect and that is just something we have to live with.”

Through outreach, the CF may have to determine which non-military organizations will be most relevant for any given mission, and then consider including them in pre-deployment training. In other words, there has to be some selection criteria for inclusion.

Having worked within the CF training system, one NGO SME thought that civil-military relations should be streamlined:

“I found it to be a little bit ad hoc in the sense that, for example, I'd been doing all the different components in training. There wasn't just one centralized place to do it. There is the Peace Support Training Centre, the Royal Military College, Canadian Forces College. Some of them have civil-military courses and some of them have it as part of another course, a joint operational planning course. I am not sure how streamlined the training on this is.”

One NGO SME advocated for the inclusion of NGOs in CF training because representatives from DFAIT and CIDA have “*incredibly different perspectives*” from NGO staff primarily because the former are political agencies. Again, broad representation of organizations in training will lead to greater exposure to the multiple players in theatre.

Non-military involvement in the training will also need to reflect the kinds of missions the CF conducts. Speaking about humanitarian relief operations, one NGO SME said that he would welcome an opportunity to integrate into CF training. He mentioned that *“we’ve been up and down with the CF... We’ve gone and done training sessions with them... We were the only NGO... The major has changed, you know, they rotate every year and half, two years... Their personnel that are in charge of it... So it’s a different guy. So you have to start back at zero... Who knows if they want the same things or not...I’d love there to be more formal discussion...I mean, we’d love to come in and help the CF evolve a little bit its methodology [i.e., approaches to humanitarian operations].”*

For example, in humanitarian efforts, as the NGO SME continued,

“If they went out with smaller units...with the focus of installation, i.e., here’s a protection detail, you know, four officers...five military members, here’s two engineers that can run a water unit, and we’re gonna move them, we’re gonna set this up, were gonna find the local NGO, we’re gonna hand over the equipment, we’re gonna train the local NGO for the next six days, we’ve got protection detail with us, we’re training a local group, our engineers are teaching, and now we’ve got exit strategy. We’ve done the handover...you’re taking over, you’re providing water, and we’re out. We [NGO] have a tangible benefit, we have achieved our tangible benefit, our personnel were safe, and your forces can take credit for it, and Canada looks good. More importantly, people have got water, which is kind of the way we do it, right, instead without the guns. So, you know I think if they just change their structure a little bit and put it into that, and you know even if they rolled out with fifteen, twenty, thirty of these things, or ten, or whatever their budget calls for, right, just move them, this is their methodology and this is what they do, they’d be, you know, they would be better received in the field... The problem that they have is with the big ROWPUs [Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units]...They’re just too big...they take forever to move. They take forever to set up...They are too expensive. They don’t work half the time...They’re not great. Smaller, nimble... set them up and go.”

So having an opportunity to participate in CF training, he believed, would be a way in which the CF could learn from the NGO community and ultimately be more effective in humanitarian operations. The result of being overly cumbersome in humanitarian operations is that their expertise is, in the mind of the NGO worker quoted above, under-utilized.

On the other hand, one CF SME said that he was astounded at how *“exceptionally brave”* NGO staff are to deploy to extremely hostile environments in the *“heart of the conflict zone...with no combat support.”* He argued that these individuals had something to teach the CF. In his words, *“I think it would be good for a military to go spend some time with them and...[ask]... ‘How do you guys do that? How do you go right in the heart of a rebel insurgency and set up medical teams and run a surgical hospital? How do you motivate your people to do that? And how do they do it in a disciplined manner, where they can sustain themselves for weeks and months on end?’”* Another NGO SME who used to be in the CF reflected a similar opinion. He said, *“you’re always going to want to have that take charge leadership in the military leader. But I think there has to be an understanding. Take a look at the UN operations...[at]...the NGO operations and what those guys have done and what they have achieved... They [CF] should come and take a look at those things, and say, you know, ‘How do these guys do that?’ And maybe put some of their people right in with those agencies and learn...I think our military leaders have to understand that there are a lot of really highly qualified people in the humanitarian world.”* This understanding, he believed, would help the CF support for humanitarian objectives. Thus, there is some evidence in this study that the

CF are open to the idea of adapting NGO methods and learning from NGO workers in the pursuit of humanitarian goals.



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4. Discussion

The purpose of this study was to advance understanding of the organizational, social and psychological factors that facilitate or inhibit collaboration among CF members and those who represent the public aspect of the JIMP framework. To this end, a number of SMEs representing diverse organizations (including NGOs, IOs, the CF, the media, and the local population) were asked to provide first-hand accounts of civil-military collaboration efforts in theatre. Specifically, we investigated the five core themes identified in previous research (Thomson et al., 2010), including negotiation approaches/styles, power, identity, perceptions/stereotypes, and trust, following a review of some of the core literature (Thomson et al., 2011). Participants offered a number of suggestions and provided examples that shed light on civil-military collaboration.

4.1 Promoting Effective Collaboration

Given its centrality in civil-military collaboration, we asked participants questions pertaining to negotiation in a JIMP operational context. When members of such diverse organizations interact, there will likely be challenges. As results showed, the actions of some players imposed critical barriers on negotiation processes. For instance, some civilian SMEs (particularly members of NGOs or IO) felt that members of the CF sometimes failed to recognize their expertise and experience. Consequently CF members sometimes failed to seek their professional advice when working with them or questioned their advice when it was provided. Indeed, such civilians thought that they were stereotyped as “*spacey*,” “*wonky*,” “*peaceniks*” by the CF. As in previous research (Thomson et al., 2010), some CF members were perceived by other players in the public domain as “*arrogant know-it-alls*,” who acted assertively and took over the process of negotiation. Participants speculated that this attitude and subsequent approach may stem from institutional ethos. Recall that one NGO SME stated that military leaders are rightly trained to “*take charge*,” and this, he continued, is their tendency when collaborating with others in the field. Maintaining a “*take charge*” attitude may be the hallmark of good leadership within the CF, but it may have unintended negative consequences when exercised in civil-military relations.

The negotiation literature suggests that achieving integrated outcomes (i.e., all parties’ needs are met as best possible) requires that counterparts listen to the concerns and interests of one another in order to locate compatible interests and generate mutually satisfactory solutions (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). Integrated or “win-win” negotiated outcomes demand the input of all parties (Thompson et al., 2010). For this outcome to occur, negotiation counterparts must adopt a cooperative stance and respect one another’s contribution. Having a “know-it-all” attitude and assertive approach, on the other hand, could be construed as competitive. Research shows that when people believe that their counterpart will negotiate competitively, they may see them as a potential threat, invoking caution and selective information processing (Vonk, 1998; as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). This study shows evidence consistent with previous research (Thomson et al., 2010) that this posture can inadvertently “*isolate*” the civilian community and potentially terminate collaboration. On the other hand, research suggests that individuals are more cooperative when they expect a cooperative counterpart (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Halpert, Stuhlmacher, Crenshaw, Litcher, & Bortel, 2010). Expected cooperation also increases information exchange (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; as cited in Halpert et al. 2010), which may help disclose parties’ interests and concerns more readily.

Articulating ways in which collaboration can improve, participants emphasized the need for open dialogue and engagement between civil and military actors in theatre. It was mentioned that the CF leadership capacity to engage is good, especially compared to other coalition forces. However, the CF was encouraged to reach out and engage more in theatre to learn about their civilian (and other public) counterparts' interests and needs, and also because it was difficult for civilians to find the relevant communication channels given the complex military structure. Contact may help reduce existing stereotypes by learning about and reappraising one's collaboration counterpart (Pettigrew, 1998), and again some civilian SMEs (members of NGOs and IOs) believed that the CF held negative stereotypes of them. Afghan nationals included in this study also stressed the importance of engagement with the local community so that the CF could understand 1) how they were being perceived and 2) how their operations impacted and were interpreted by the local population.

Participants suggested that, among other things, individuals who participated in civil-military collaboration should be open and flexible. Research shows that if negotiators are prosocially motivated (i.e., they seek a fair distribution of resources from negotiations and are concerned with other's well-being; De Dreu, 2004), then they are also likely to remain flexible and openminded even if they negotiate with a competitive counterpart (Carnevale & Probst, 1998; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Prosocially motivated negotiators are willing to make concessions, make lenient openings to negotiations and ultimately end with higher gains (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996; both cited in De Dreu, 2004). It seems then that individuals who desire a fair distribution of resources may operate effectively in the JIMP context because of their ability to remain open to another's position and be flexible enough to work toward integrated outcomes even when they confront a competitive negotiator. Of course, this is an empirical question that should be validated by research.

Consistent with previous research (Thomson et al., 2010), data showed that participants, both civilian and military, recommended building strong relationships as a strategy to enhance collaboration. A few emphasized that in theatre this needs to be accomplished right from the start in order to break the ice. Participants gave a few examples of how they built relationships in operations, including locating common ground with counterparts, holding inclusive social events, providing gifts at the introduction, and "*mak[ing] nice*." This approach is consistent with CF pre-deployment training for United Nations Military Observers. Here students are encouraged to establish common ground and a positive relationship at the outset of any negotiation before getting down to business (Peace Support Training Centre, 2003). Though achieving profit (i.e., the settled value) is a central negotiation outcome, researchers point out that strong relationships are also critical to successful negotiations (Halpert et al., 2010) and in fact have been shown to be a stronger predictor of the willingness to participate in future negotiations than instrumental outcomes (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). As the data indicated, this is consistent within the context of civil-military relations.

However, data suggest that one of the stresses on relationship building between civil and military actors in theatre relates to the need of NGO personnel to uphold the principle of neutrality to operate effectively. They view the military as sometimes "*co-opting the [humanitarian] language*" for their "*strategies*." On one level, breaching the principle of neutrality puts aid workers at risk of harm. Participants caution that interaction with the military may be perceived as favouring one side over another in a conflict, thereby potentially making themselves a target or preventing them from operating in particular spaces. Speaking on behalf of her organization, one NGO SME said, "*we're not in a position to be part of the comprehensive approaches, because we see that it really impinges on our capacity to access people who are most in need*." On another more fundamental level, the nature of an aid worker's identity (as a member of a humanitarian organization) may be

in jeopardy if they are seen to be working with the military. Meharg (2007, p. 102) argues that to maintain one's identity, it is important to have "a clear professional identity...to ensure people know who they are dealing with and do not confuse one for another." Evidence from SME discussions suggests that NGO and IO personnel strive to act in accordance with Meharg's assertion. In order to protect their identity, they strongly instill in their personnel the group's values and principles and encourage them to act in accordance with these in operations, especially when dealing with the military. These data suggest that maintaining distinctiveness between organizations through a clear delineation of and adherence to one's professional organization preserves social identity. As part of the group, members are able to act on and influence the environment in accordance with the group's values and goals (Turner, 2005). In other words, strong adherence to one's group identity may, in turn, lead to necessary social capital in the field.

The interprofessional collaboration literature states that inequality among professionals arising from power differences constitutes a major barrier to effective collaboration (San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, D'Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). However, participant responses suggest that power struggles did not arise from an imbalance of resources, the typical construal of power differences (resource dependence perspective – Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Emerson, 1962; as cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005), but rather from CF attempts to work outside of their jurisdiction in the areas of development and diplomacy. Civilian participants suggest that the military should remain in their lane and, if they have to be a part of development or diplomacy, then they should consult those with the requisite expertise and offer their (CF) services in a supportive capacity, rather than forging on ahead in a leadership role. However, data also suggest that NGOs and IOs do not really know what the CF could do to support their humanitarian efforts. Again, outreach to the various organizations that the CF may have contact with in theatre may be a way for such organizations to learn about what services the CF has that can be leveraged to realize integrated outcomes in operations (e.g., humanitarian, COIN, etc.).

Striking a balance in one's negotiation approach augmented by a desire to see others also benefit from the process (prosocial) will be important in an operational context that has multiple diverse actors negotiating shared resources. As shown in other work (Thomson et al., 2010), truly enhancing the ability of the CF to collaborate within the JIMP context will require attention to developing and continually promoting a culture of collaboration. Research has shown that organizations that espouse the values of participation, fairness, freedom of expression and interdependence (Evans, 1994, Henneman et al., 1995; both cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005), and promote a climate of openness, integrity and trust (Stichler, 1995; as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005), will likely produce the appropriate attitudes and values for successful collaboration. Thus, ensuring that these values disseminate across the CF as an organization may help foster a positive attitude toward collaboration.

4.2 The Way Forward

SME discussions identified some of the pros and cons of civil-military collaboration in theatre. The next steps could include experimentation, specifically examining some of the variables outlined in the preliminary framework of CF collaboration in a JIMP operational context (Thomson et al., 2010). Research could investigate how the conditions for collaboration (e.g., shared goals, shared values, shared power, shared risk, mutual trust, mutual respect, established roles and responsibilities) impact critical collaboration activities, such as negotiation, and collaboration outcomes. For example, failure to recognize the input of others was a prominent finding in this and previous work (Thomson et al., 2010), suggesting a lack of respect of one's collaboration

counterpart. Examining how this impacts collaboration may be one possible area of study. Another possible study could examine the correlation between conditions of collaboration and the outcomes following a negotiation. This will help determine if all of the conditions need to be satisfied in order to have a positive collaborative outcome.

Participants also underscored the importance of having the right person with the right skill sets working with individuals who represent diverse organizations. Indeed, almost every participant said that collaboration in the field came down to “personality.” Asked what characteristics an individual should possess in order to operate effectively in a JIMP context, they identified openness, flexibility, empathy (i.e., the ability to understand different points of view), having good judgement, being a good listener, diplomacy, being strong willed, having patience, perseverance, good health, social skills, and having a sense of humour. Moreover, Brown and Adams (2011) conducted a literature review investigating potential measures of individual competencies requisite for effectively working within a JIMP operational context with multiple, diverse organizations and people. Categories of competency measurements fell under culture skills, individual characteristics, motivation, professionalism, problem-solving, thinking skills, and social skills (Brown & Adams, 2011). Future research could consider incorporating valid competency measures in training scenarios to determine the correlation between competencies and collaboration outcomes. In other words, do competencies for a JIMP environment predict collaboration outcomes?

Earlier work conducted for DRDC Toronto might be utilized as a research platform for these proposals. Hall, Karthaus, Adams, and Mangan (2009) developed an E-Prime computer simulation of an interactive negotiation. The negotiation was based on a United Nations Military Observer pre-deployment training scenario. Though the content of the dialogue within the current scenario would need to be altered somewhat for this type of research, the platform would serve well for research within the JIMP context.

Another goal of this research was to consider how collaboration can be facilitated through pre-deployment training and education initiatives. Participants recommended that disseminating knowledge about the multiple actors involved in operations would help facilitate more effective civil-military collaboration. This may be accomplished through pre-deployment education and training initiatives that are fully integrated, relevant and multi-directional. It is important that training and education is inclusive of the various perspectives, sharing organizational values and goals.

Future research ultimately needs to identify ways to both overcome challenges that arise in the field and capitalize on achievements for future collaboration. Participant discussions are rich with examples of how they ensured effective civil-military collaboration in theatre. Sharing responses and recommendations with the official CF training and education system, including the Land Forces Doctrine and Training System and the Canadian Defence Academy, may begin the process of incorporating pertinent research findings regarding civil-military collaboration into CF training and education mechanisms.

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Annex A: Information Letter

Dear Participant:

Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) Toronto is conducting research to improve the effectiveness of collaboration among the diverse actors in an operational field setting, often referred to as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) or the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) approach to operations. Based upon your experience in this area we are asking for your participation in this research effort. The purpose of the current study is to utilize the expertise and experience of individuals who have worked in these missions to increase our understanding of the nature of collaboration between the CF and other actors, such as various governmental agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, the media, and local populations in order to highlight factors that facilitate or frustrate the process of collaboration, and to identify strategies to improve collaboration in a contemporary operational setting, such as Afghanistan.

As you are aware, the changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries increasingly taking on roles in support of humanitarian relief and reconstruction, a field traditionally belonging to civilian organizations. Although there is an emerging international literature highlighting the continuing challenges in this area, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective. Thus, the objective of the present study is to gain a better understanding of collaboration within these new operational environments when agencies and personnel must work together in order to accomplish their respective goals. Again the goal of this research is to meet with experienced individuals like yourself, and to understand the issues from your perspective. Your experiences and insights will be used in a variety of ways:

- 1) to begin to identify the core elements and themes for promoting civil-military collaborations in an operational setting;
- 2) for the potential future development of realistic training and education vignettes or scenarios;
- 3) to identify best practices or lessons learned through the detailing of collaboration strategies employed in theatre; and
- 4) as the basis of future laboratory and field/survey studies.

Your candid experience operating in this capacity is vital for developing an inclusive and detailed picture of civil-military collaboration in an operational setting.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 2 hours of your time to participate in a one-on-one meeting to share your personal experiences of collaborating while in the field. SME meetings will be held in person. We will travel to meet with you. Alternatively, if an in-person meeting is not possible, a phone discussion can be arranged at your convenience.

In general, the idea for the meeting is that you will describe the collaboration context(s) in which you have been involved, the factors that either facilitated or frustrated collaboration, and any strategies that you used to ensure effective collaboration. We will also ask you what kinds of things you would do differently in hindsight to ensure successful collaboration and why, and what kinds of things you would like in advance of operations (e.g., training opportunities) that would facilitate effective collaboration.



We recognize that you are busy and that participating in this study takes up your time. We are able to give you a small remuneration for your time in the amount of \$40.00.

The information that you provide in the meeting will be kept anonymous and in order to ensure the confidentiality of yourself and others, we ask that you do not mention specific individuals or groups by name, or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this meeting. This acts as protection to you in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request. Please also note that your comments during the meeting are covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify you personally cannot be released without your consent.

With your consent, the meeting will be audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis and will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the research teams involved with this or ensuing projects. We will use a code number rather than a name to further ensure anonymity. Once our meeting has been transcribed, if you would like, you will be provided with a copy so that you may review the contents, point out any errors in the transcription, and indicate any aspects you feel might be identifying characteristics. Any material used in the write-up of the final report or subsequent publications or presentations will have any and all identifying characteristics removed. If you wish, you can choose not to be audio-recorded but still participate in this research (in this event, the researcher will take detailed notes during your meeting).

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic of discussion makes you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer or skip any question, end the discussion, or withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached Voluntary Consent Form, as well as the Biographical Data Form. We will collect these when we convene for our meeting with you.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) has approved this study (Revised Protocol L-692A, Amendment #2). If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the project leads for this research, Dr. Megan M. Thompson or Dr. Angela Febbraro, whose contact information is listed below. You may also contact the Chair of the HREC at DRDC Toronto, Dr. Jack Landolt, at Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or (416) 635-2120.

Sincerely,

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Annex B: Voluntary Consent Form

Title: Discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the JIMP Domain

Principal Investigator: Michael Thomson, Humansystems Inc.

Principal DRDC Investigator: Dr. Angela Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Co-Investigators: Dr. Megan M. Thompson, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; Dr. Barb Adams, Humansystems Inc.; Dr. Tara Holton, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Thrusts: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain (PG2); 14ci, Interagency Trust (PG4)

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate in the study entitled, “Discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the JIMP Domain” (Protocol Protocol L-692A, Amendment #2). I have read the information letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research study and have any questions about this study answered by contacting either Dr. Angela R. Febbraro at 416-635-2000 Extension 3120 or Dr. Megan M. Thompson at 416-635-2040.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a single one-on-one meeting lasting approximately 2 hours, which will be audio-recorded only with my consent. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form. I understand that the audio-recorded meeting will be transcribed, and that I will have an opportunity to read and comment on the transcription if I so choose. I also have the option of participating in this study without being audio-taped, in which case the researcher will take notes during the meeting.

I have been told that risks associated with this research are minimal. However, if when discussing topics I feel uncomfortable, I may move on to another topic. I also understand that I may terminate my participation at any time. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly anonymous and will not be revealed to anyone other than the research team without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Principal DRDC Investigator or other DRDC Investigators, and that these data too will be treated as strictly anonymous and will not be revealed to anyone other than the research team without my consent.

I understand that my data will be protected under the Government Security Policy (GSP) and not revealed to anyone other than the DRDC-affiliated Investigator(s) or external investigators from the sponsoring agency without my consent except as data unidentified as to source.

I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to the data and/or any publication arising from this study. While experimental data may be reviewed by an internal or external research audit committee I understand that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I understand that, as a Government Institution, DRDC is committed to protecting my personal information. Although copies of research reports and research data (including the database

pertaining to this project) held in Federal government files may be disclosed under the Access to Information Act, I understand that prior to releasing the requested information, the Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) screens the data in accordance with the Privacy Act in order to ensure that individual identities, including indirect identification due to the collection of a series of unique details that taken together might serve to identify me (e.g., occupation, position and deployment-related history), are protected. I have also been told that I should not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups in the course of this meeting, as protection to me in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration of \$40.00.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication or presentation arising from this study.

For Civilian Participants:

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

For Canadian Forces (CF) members only: I understand that I am considered to be on duty for disciplinary, administrative and Pension Act purposes during my participation in this study.

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence R&D Canada –Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (Project Manager, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain Project)

- Dr. Megan M. Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2040, Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (Project Manager, Interagency Trust Project)
- **Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC):** Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.



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Annex C: Biographical Data Form

1. Age _____

2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):

☐ Male

☐ Female

3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):

☐ Single

☐ Married

☐ Divorced

☐ Widowed

☐ Common-Law

4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):

☐ Some High School

☐ Completed High School

☐ Some College

☐ Completed College

☐ Some Trade School

☐ Completed Trade School

☐ Some University

☐ Completed Undergraduate Degree

☐ University Professional Degree

☐ Some Graduate Courses

☐ Master's Degree

☐ Doctorate

5. Country of birth: _____

6. Heritage/ethnicity: _____

7. Number of years ____ working for...: _____

8. Current occupation with...: _____

9. Names of organizations previously worked for: _____

10. How long have you worked (in months) for the following other organizations:

11. Frequency of contact with the Canadian Forces or other military in field work?
very frequent____ frequent____ infrequent____ very infrequent____ not at all____

12. Have you ever served in the Canadian Forces or another military? Y____ N____ (if yes, please specify) _____

13. Operations (overseas and domestic, purpose, organization, time and duration):

14. First language:

☐ English

☐ French

☐ Other (please specify) _____

Annex D: Discussion Protocol

I. Introduction:

Thank you for participating in this meeting. We appreciate how busy your schedule is and that you have taken the time to meet with us today to share some of your experience in civil-military collaborations in an operational/field setting.

As we mentioned in our initial contact with you, this meeting is meant to help us gain a better understanding of the factors that facilitated or frustrated your collaboration efforts in operations. We are also interested in understanding the particular contexts in which you had to collaborate. This will help broaden our understanding of the nature of collaboration. We are hoping to develop from you and others like yourself a thorough understanding of collaboration in the context of comprehensive missions. This understanding will assist us in a variety of ways, including compiling lessons learned, the development of potential training and education scenarios, and contributing to the development of a conceptual framework depicting collaboration within comprehensive missions.

To do this, we will be asking you a series of open-ended questions so that you can describe freely the collaboration situations that you faced in the field. As the discussion moves along and we identify topics or issues, which have previously shown themselves to be prevalent in discussions with other SMEs, we may ask you to comment further or elaborate on your own experiences/opinions—should you have any—related to the particular topic, if that is okay with you.

Over the course of our meeting, we ask that you speak freely and as openly as possible so that we can capture the themes associated with collaboration in this particular kind of context and to include as much detail as possible so that we can capture the full context of your experiences.

However, your participation is voluntary; please recount only the experiences and details that you are comfortable sharing, and feel free to skip any question that you would prefer not to answer. I want to stress that your responses will be kept anonymous and that only members of the research team will have access to the data. We also ask that you do not use any identifying information that may compromise your confidentiality or the confidentiality of those you have worked with in theatre. We will review the transcripts as well to ensure that no identifying information is included. If you would like, we will also provide you with a copy of the transcript so that you may review it for content and for any points that you would like to delete if you so choose. May we proceed on that basis?

Before we get started, I would like to ask if we could audio-record our meeting, so that we can ensure the accuracy of your comments. This will also help us when we analyze all of the SME discussions.

II. Career Background:

We'd like to begin by asking you to talk a little bit about your career history. Please include how long have you worked as/with... (e.g., NGO, CF, etc.), how you came to work with... (e.g., NGO, the CF), why were you interested in a career working with..., what kinds of roles have you had while a member of..., etc. Are there any other organizations (e.g., CF, NGOs, IOs, etc.) that you have belonged to prior to joining...?



Are there any other aspects of your career history that you would like to share before we move on to discuss actual collaboration experiences?

III. Collaboration Experiences:

Before we start discussing your collaboration experiences, could you list those organizations and populations that you have collaborated with in operations? We're really just trying to focus our discussion here to include the most relevant organizations in your mind.

What we would like now is to ask you to describe for us situations in which you had to collaborate with other individuals from different organizations. For example, why did you have to collaborate? Please also include instances that help to illustrate the nature of collaboration, including any challenges you confronted when collaborating (i.e., the kinds of factors that frustrated your ability to collaborate). For example, how would you describe communication with other organizations, such as the CF/NGOs? How did you develop rapport and how did this impact the outcomes of your collaboration? Were there particular negotiating styles that were more (or less) effective? How did you develop and maintain personal relationships with key collaboration partners? Did stereotypes ever come into play in relationships? What about the notion of social identity (us vs. them) – was that ever important? To what extent were the roles and responsibilities of collaboration partners defined? What organizational factors impacted the process of collaboration?

We're interested in hearing how you resolved any challenges you faced when collaborating as well.

In hindsight, what kinds of suggestions do you have to facilitate collaboration?

We want to hear about any factors that helped collaboration. What were these factors? How did they come into play? Are there particular personal or interpersonal characteristics or techniques that you think would be helpful for collaboration? Did mutual trust or respect play a role? What about shared goals, or shared power? Was there a sense of give-and-take in terms of working out a way to collaborate (e.g., adopting an approach to planning or decision-making that incorporated the approaches of the various organizations working together)? What might be the differences between those situations where collaboration was challenging compared to those situations where collaboration was not as challenging?

How and why might collaboration with other diverse organizations be beneficial, from your perspective?

What are the kinds of things that you might do differently in order to promote effective collaboration in future? Are there things that you know now that you would have liked to have known then? How would these have made a difference?

What kind of training did you receive from your organization just prior to deployment that helped you collaborate effectively in a comprehensive operational context? In hindsight, what kind of training or education do you think you could (or should) have received from your organization during the course of your career more generally that may have helped you collaborate more effectively in a comprehensive operational context?

Can you think of any (other) organization-level systems, structures and/or tools that might promote better collaboration in the future? And finally, what do you think the future holds for this type of collaboration?

IV. Conclusion:

That concludes our meeting. Are there any other comments you would like to make about your experiences collaborating with other organizations or about the research in general?

We are leaving you with the Information Sheet and the contact information of the DRDC investigators leading this research. Please feel free to contact them if you have any additional questions or comments.

Thank you for your time. We greatly appreciate your input!



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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Description
ADO	Adaptive Dispersed Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARP	Applied Research Project
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DAIP	Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DLZs	Drop Landing Zones
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
FSG	Fire Support Group
GPS	Global Positioning System
GSP	Government Security Policy
HREC	Human Research Ethics Committee
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOs	International Organizations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public
JTF2	Joint Task Force 2
KAF	Kandahar Air Field
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
LZ	Landing Zone
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OGDs	Other Governmental Departments
OPSEC	Operational Security
PR	Public Relations

PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PWGSC	Public Works Goods and Services Canada
QA	Quality Assurance
ROWPU	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
SMEs	Subject Matter Experts
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
UN	United Nations
WoG	Whole of Government

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(U) In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse civilian (“public”) organizations, including Non–Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. However, the CF’s history of working with, for example, NGOs, has been limited and may pose challenges to collaboration (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). The purpose of this study was to 1) further understand the core issues that help or hinder civil–military collaboration, specifically involving the CF, NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, and the media, and 2) highlight recommendations for potential training and education for effective civil–military collaboration in the public domain. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs), representing diverse organizations and entities, both military (CF) and civilian (NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, the media), were consulted to elicit first–hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Results indicated that the CF did not effectively acknowledge their counterpart’s expertise and experience and that the CF should refrain from “taking charge” and telling others how to do their job. Civilian participants said that the CF had open dialogue and that CF leaders were good at engaging, but that the CF could engage more with civilians and civil organizations given the challenges faced by civilians in navigating the military system and CF communication channels. Military and civilian participants said that one strategy to facilitate collaboration was to build positive relationships. However, civilian SMEs thought that the military overstepped its jurisdiction and that roles and responsibilities needed to be clearly established. NGO or IO adherence to the principle of neutrality varied across organizations and this had potential negative ramifications for the ability of some organizations to operate safely in non–permissive environments. Participants included both negative and positive perceptions about one another. Stereotype reduction occurred following contact with one another and after learning about another organization’s values, intentions, and operational objectives and goals. Afghan nationals provided examples of CF trust violations that may turn the local population against them. Overall, participants argued that there was a general lack of knowledge regarding the contemporary operating theatre and the multiple players involved. Gaining knowledge of potential collaboration counterparts was the core recommendation for future training and education to support civil–military collaboration in a comprehensive operating context, including the public domain, and this training and education needs to be fully integrated.

(U) Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont plus que jamais appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d’organisations variées, c’est à dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d’autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Cependant, le fait que les FC n’aient pas eu souvent l’occasion par le passé de travailler auprès d’ONG, par exemple, peut entraver la collaboration entre ces organisations (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008). Le but de cette étude était de 1) mieux connaître les principaux facteurs qui favorisent ou entravent la collaboration civilo militaire, en particulier lorsque les parties concernées sont les FC, des ONG, des OI, des citoyens afghans et les médias, et 2) recueillir les recommandations relativement à la formation et à l’éducation dans le but d’accroître l’efficacité de la collaboration civilo militaire en contexte public. Nous avons demandé à des experts de diverses organisations et entités militaires (FC) et civiles (ONG, OI, citoyens afghans,

médias) de raconter leurs expériences de collaboration dans le théâtre. Les résultats ont révélé que les FC n'ont pas su tirer pleinement profit de l'expertise et de l'expérience de leurs homologues et qu'elles devraient éviter de « prendre les choses en main » et de dire aux autres comment faire leur travail. Les participants civils ont mentionné que les FC sont ouvertes au dialogue et que leurs dirigeants savent mobiliser le personnel efficacement, mais qu'elles pourraient travailler encore plus étroitement avec les civils afin d'aider ces derniers à se familiariser avec l'appareil militaire et les voies de communication des FC. Les participants civils et militaires s'entendaient pour dire que l'établissement de relations positives facilite la collaboration. Toutefois, les EM civils croient que les militaires outrepassent parfois leurs champs de compétence et que les rôles et les responsabilités devraient ainsi être définis plus clairement. Le respect des ONG et des OI au principe de neutralité varie d'une organisation à l'autre, ce qui peut nuire la capacité de certaines d'entre elles à évoluer sécuritairement en milieu hostile. Les participants ont émis des commentaires tant positifs que négatifs à propos des uns des autres. On a observé que les stéréotypes s'estompent lorsque les gens entrent en contact et lorsqu'ils approfondissent leurs connaissances au sujet des valeurs, des intentions et des objectifs opérationnels des autres organisations. Des citoyens afghans ont signalé des cas d'abus de confiance de la part des FC qui pourraient avoir contribué à retourner la population locale contre elles. Dans l'ensemble, les participants ont indiqué que leurs connaissances à propos du théâtre d'opérations contemporain et des nombreux acteurs qui y œuvrent sont insuffisantes. La principale recommandation concernant la formation et l'éducation liées à la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte opérationnel vise à mettre davantage l'accent sur l'acquisition de connaissances au sujet des collaborateurs potentiels, notamment ceux de la sphère publique. Pour y parvenir, il faut mettre en place un programme de formation et d'éducation pleinement homogène.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) Civil-military collaboration; comprehensive approach; JIMP

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